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LAW SCHOOL COMMENCEMENT.

reate address was delivered by that distinguisied and eminent jurist, Hon. J.
Hay Brown, LL. )., Justice of the SuMr.
preme Court of Pennsylvania.
Brown's address Nyas a strong, powerful
and masterly one, and well received by the
large audience.
After this address, degrees were conferred upon the class, which numbers
thirty, and the prizes were awarded; after
which Dr. Reed conferred the degree of
Doctor of Laws on the distinguished
speaker of the evening, Hon. J. Hay
Brown. The exercises closed with a selection by the orchestra.
The following is a list of those on whom
degrees were conferred:

The Commencement of nineteen-one was
one of the most interesting and attractive
which have been held at Old Dickinson
for many years. Much might be said concerning all of the exercises of the week,
but space will not permit, and we must
confine ourselves to a brief mention of the
most important events. The weather was
at its best, being cool and pleasant. The
exercises for the week began with the
Baccalaureate sermon by Dr. Reed' on
Sunday morning, June 2nd. Dr. Reed
delivered one of his characteristic, strong
and emphatic sermons, and administered
sound and impartial advice to the class.
The-Commencement exercises proper of
THREE-YEAR COURSE.
the Law School were held in Bosler Hall
Jasper Alexander, Harry P. Katz,
on Tuesday evening, June 4th, beginning
at 8 P. x. The hall was welt filled, and 'Samuel E. Basehore, Jos. B. Kennedy,
the exercises of a most interesting charac- Wn. Stuart Clark, William H. Kern,
John Kemp,
ter. After a selection by the orchestra, Daniel F. Deal,
W. Alfred Valentine, '01, as class repre- Leon W. Edwards, Daniel Kline,
Jas. N. Lightner,
sentative, delivered an excellent oration. Lloyd L. Frank,
Arthur W. Mitchell,
The oration Is printed elsewhere in this Wm. B. Gery,
Chas. A. Piper,
issue. After a second selection had been Philip M. Graul,
rendered by the orchestra, the Bacealau- H. M. Henderson, Warren L. Shipman,
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Floyd L. Hess,
Win. T. Stauffer,
Lorrie R. Holcomb, Win. H. Tiylor,
Win.W. Johnson. W. Alfred Valentine.

Barry P. Katz, '01, has been admitted
to practice in the several courts of W. Va.

TWO-YEAR COURSE.

The following is taken from "The
Scranton Republican":
Any mention of the younger attorneys
of the city would be incomplete without
the name of Mr. D. L. Fickes, with offices
at 81-13 Mears building, who graduated
overture-"Serenade" ...................................
Herbert
from Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle,
Address-The Responsibilities of the American
Pa., in 1895, and at once commenced the
Lawyer, W. Alfred Valentine, '01.
Selection-'G uardsrnount" ........................
practice of law. He has built up a fine busiEhlnberg
Baccalaureate Addressness, making a specialty of common pleas
Hon. J. Hay Brown, Justice of the Supreme
and
orphans' court and he has been emiCourt of Pennsylvania.
nently successful in settling up a nunmber
Selection-'Cupid's Garden' ..........................
Eugene
of states.
Conferring of Degrees.
Awarding- of Prizes.
Mr. Fickes is also interested in many
Selection-"Cuban Independence" ...........
Hennhiger
valuable parcels of real estate, and during
The committee in charge deserves the
the past two years has been identified with
thanks and congratulations of all for the
some large transactions in realty. He also
large amount of work which fell to their
makes a specialty of loaningmoney on first
lot and for the successful outcome of their
mortgage and his clients may always feel
ef-orts. The committee was as follows:
assured that their interests are in nost
Arthur W. Mitchell, chairman, William
capableand efficient hands if placed in this
Stuart Clark, Chas. A. Piper, Win. T.
gentleman's care.
Barton B. Barr,
Ralph D. Nichols,
Wi. E. Elmes,
Win. H. Trude,
N. Russell Turner.
The following was the order of theexercises:

Stauffer, Ralph D. Nicholls.
The ushers were A. M. Hoagland, Walter
P. Bishop, Chas. S. Kline and Jos. P. MeKeehan.
ALUMNI NOTES.
Harrison Walker, '96, spent several days
in town during the latter part of May.
Thomas E. Vale, '91, has been nominated for District Attorney of Cumberland
County.
Arthur M. Devall, '99, will in all probability be nominated for District Attorney
of Potter county. A nomination in that
county is equal to an election.
The following men visited Carlisle during the Commencement season: William
A. Jordan, '99, Isaiah Sheeline, '99, S. W.
Kirk, '96, 0. W. A. Rochow, '96, Robert
W. Irving, '98, Edward Taylor Daugherty
and W. W. Mearkle.
Arthur W. Mitchell, '01, was admitted
to practice in the several courts of McKean
county. Mr. Mitchell is the first man to
be admitted of this year's class to the
home bar. We wish Mr. Mitchell success.

Hon. W. D Boyer, '92, and E. J. McCune were elected to the Board of Incorporators of the Dickinson School of Law
at their last meeting here on June 4th.
The following men were admitted to
practice in the several courts of Cumberland county on Wednesday, June 5th.
We wish to congratulate them upon the
successful termination of their courses and
trust they will meet with a full share of
success:
Alexander, Basellore,Clark, Deal, Frank,
Gery, Graul, Harpel, Henderson, Hess,
Holcomb, Johnston, Katz, Kennedy,
Kern, Kline, Lightner, Mitchell, Piper,
Shipman, Stauffer, Taylor, Valentine,
and Nicholls.
HILDRETH-TOWNSEND.

Cape May, June 5.-Amid a bower of
June roses, yesterday, at noon, Mr. Llewellyn Hildreth, of Rio Grande, was married
to Miss Mary E. Townsend, daughter of
Samuel Townsend, of Cold Spring. The
event occurred at the home of the bride's
parents, and was witnessed by the families
of contracting parties and a number of
their intimate friends. Rev. A. J. Gregory,
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pastor of the Tabernacle Methodist Episcopal church, officiated. The newly wedded couple are prominent in educational
circles, havingtaught in the publiesehools
in Cape May county for a number of years.
KISER-BUTLER.

Bridgeton, June 5.-This afternoon there
was a pretty home wedding, Mr. Harvey
Selner Kiser, a rising young lawyer of
Doylestown, Pa., and Miss Mary Louisa
Butler, eldest daughter of Stephen Butl;er,
of this city. being the contracting parties.
The ceremony was performed by Rev.
A. Percival Hodgson, of Roxborough,
Philadelphia. Mr. and Mrs. Kiser left.
here on an afternoon train for Buffalo and
Niagara Falls. They will reside in Doylestown.
PRIZES AWARDED.
The Win. C. Allison prize was awarded
to W. L. Shipman, of Sunbury. of the
Senior class, for the best thesis on the
Landlord's Remedy of Distress.
The Win. D. Boyer prize, No. 3, was
divided between L. Floyd Hess, '01, and
A. M. Hoagland, '03, for the best examination in Torts.
The Win. D. Boyer prize, No. 1, was
awarded to Jos. P. McKeehan, '02, for the
best examination in Evidence.
The Win. D. Boyer prize, No. 2, was
divided between Crary and Lambert.
for excellence in the law of real property.
The first Dean's prize was awarded to
Win. E. Elmes, for the best briefs in cases
heard in the M'oot Court during the January-June term of 1901.
The second Dean's prize was divided between Schantz and Gerber, for the best
examination in Real Property.
The William D. Boyer prize, No. 4, was
awarded to William H. Taylor, for the
best thesis on the Law of False Pretences
in Pennsylvania.
THESES.
The following are the topics upon which
the graduating students of this year have
written:
Incompetency of Witnesses-Stauffer.
Sales of Land by Executors and Administrators-Gery.

Subjects of Mechanics' Liens-Frank.
Widows' Exemption -Alexander.
Character Evidence-Harpel.
Fraudulent Conveyances-Piper.
Widows' Exemption-Basehore.
Widows' Exemption-Lightner.
Replevin in Pennsylvania-Clark.
R-covery of Money Paid Under Mistake
-Edwards.
Law of Murder-Henderson.
Defalcation-Kennedy.
Plaintiff in Execution of a Fi. Fa.Shipman.
Evidence Excluded by Reason of Public
Policy-Barr.
Sales of Personal Property-Turner.
Suretyship-Kemp.
Law of Turnpikes in PennsylvaniaValentine.
Justices' Jurisdiction in Crimes-Hes.
History of Rule in Shelly's Case in
United States-Nicholls.
Law of Murder in Pennsylvania-Graul.
Admissibility of Extra-Judicial Evidence-Holcomb.
Contingent Remainders-Kline.
Competency of Witnesses-Elmes.

ABOUT OUR MOOT COURTS.
As the Moot Court is a specialty in our
school, a word of explanation to those
who, not being of it, may see this number
of the FORUMi, may not be inappropriate.
Three nights a week are devoted to this
work. On each night two cases are heard.
Some days in advance, statements of facts
are handed down to four students, who
are to act as counsel, two on each side.
The sides are determined by lot or agreement, or are prescribed by the professor.
It then becomes the duty of the counsel to
study the case, settle upon the issue, investigate the authorities, prepare briefs
and at the appointed time make oral argument.
During the year just closing, a student
has sat as judge; five students, therefore,
are engaged in every case. After the argument, the judge prepares an opinion,
and judgment or decree, from which the
disappointed party lvay appeal to the
Dean, who, in turn, writes an opinion containing his decision. Thus it happens
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that in every case five students are en- upon Falstaff and his crowd, Sir John is
made to say: "Come, my masters, let us
gaged.
The FoRum is designed primarily to share and then to horse before day. An
embody and preserve the work of the the Prince and Poins be not two arrant
Moot Court. Nearly all the cases are re- cowards, there's no equity stirring." Now,
ported in it; the statement of facts, ab- this declaration, which by its position
stracts of the briefs, with the names of seems to have been intended as the climax
counsel; the opinions of the students who of a most humorous scene, falls perfectly
sit as judges in the lower courts, and th4 flat to the unenlightened reader. And yet
opinions on appeal. During the year now not one of the many learned Shakesperean
closing: one hundred and fifty-six cases interpreters has ever attempted to throw
have been heard, each student having, on a beam of light upon the passage. The
the average, been counsel in six cases, and theory of Judge Phelps is that it was
the members of the two upper classes hav- neither more nor less than a timely "gag,"
ing served as judges three or four times.
and one which must have appealed very
It is thus seen that during the course strongly to the audience of the day. In
of three years a student acquires a very support of his view, he reveals with rare
considerable practice in the preparation of skill the many interesting incidents and
cases for court, in the compilation of the bitter personalities which characbriefs, in oral argument before the court, terized the struggle between the law
in the weighing of the decisions, often re- judges and their brothers in the court of
quiring much reflection to harmonize, in equity, and which made that struggle an
the formation of definitive conclusions all-absorbing topic of daily conversation
concerning what the law is, and in lit- among all classes of people. Heale's case,
erary composition. We can safely say Throckmorton v. Finch, and other famous
that no other school furnishes to the causes are shown to have aroused the
student so extensive and varied a training highest pitch of rartisan excitement, and
in these particulars.
it is pointed out that the mere suggestion
that equity was not stirring, must have
been so far from the known fact as to be
BOOK REVIEWS.
ludicrous in a high degree.
FALSTAFF AND EQUITY.-An InterThe book is really of much greater value
pretationby CharlesE. Phelps-Haugh- than its name and purpose indicate, and
ton, Mifflin and Company, Boston and we wonder if the author's work did not
expand far beyond his original conception.
New York, 1901, pp. xvi, 201.
The title of this volume is likely to However that may be, the history of the
arouse, at first glimpse, the curiosity of great judicial war is so entertainingly told
the lawyer. For what, pray, had the that the reader is likely to forget ere he
fat, gay and witty Sir John to do with turns fifty pages that it is all for the sake
such a dull and abstruse thing as Equity ? of explaining a joke.
Just this, that he once cracked a joke upon
it; the point of which, long lost, Judge
THE ELEMENTS OF INTERNAPhelps has re-discovered and revealed to
TIONAL LAW, with an account of its
the world.
origin, sources and historical developIt may be recalled that in what is
ment-By George B. Davis-arper
known as the Gadshill Adventure, 1
and Brothers, New York and London,
Henry IV, Act II, Scene 2, Prince Hal
1901, pp. xxvi, 612.
and Poins, carrying out their understanding at Falstaff's expense, have contrived
to absent themselves at the critical moment, thus leaving Sir John with Bardolph and the rest to rob the travelers without their aid. At the moment which
intervenes between the highway robbery
and the attack by the Prince and Poins

This is a new, completely revised and enlarged edition of the author's earlier work,
the most notable addition to the text being
that of a number of the more important
cases to which the international experiences of the last fifteen years have
given rise. The volume remains, however,
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what it was originally intended to be, not
a manual or an exhaustive treatise, but
essentially a text-book-for the use of students. As such, the analysis and arrangement are admirable, and the references,
both at the'foot of the pages and the close
of the chapters, notably complete.
The
work has been used, we believe, in a large
number of universities, colleges and law
schools, and its author, who is the professor of law at West Point and deputy
Judge-Advocate General in the United
States army, is a widely recognized and
approved authority. The book is certainly
a timely one, for rarely, if ever, have our
people been confronted by international
problems of such gravity and interest as
at the present day. It is a pleasure to
note that the value of the work is greatly
enhanced by an exceptionally complete
Index and list of authorities.
The following books are acknowledged.
Reviews will follow:
AMERICAN LAw.-By James DeWitt
Andrews-Callaghan and Company,
Chicago, 1900.
LAW OF REAL PPoPERTY.-Three volumes.-By Charles T. Boone-BancroftWhitney Co., San Francisco, 1901.
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS on the adoption of the Federal

Constitution.-Five volumes.
Second
edition.-By Jonathan Elliot-J. B.
Lippincott Company, Philadelphia,
1901.
RESPONSIBILI7IES OF AMERICAN
LAWYERS.
(Address by W. Alfred Valentine.)

Born at the dawn of civilization, cradled
in the dim far-off mists of antiquity, the
child of wisdom and justice sprang into
being and from the earliest era of which
man has record, law has flourished and
waxed strong; with a slow but steady
growth it has brought order out of chaos,
until now it reigns supreme throughout
the earth, all people and all tongues are
under Its sway, and all men pay it reverence.
"Men die, laws never" said the astute
crafty Richelieu,and in his words the law
and its progress and influence is epito-

mized. Jurisprudence has seen kings rise
and fall, empires hold sway over countless
hosts and boundless acres, only to fall at
last into ashes and decay, leaving behind
them only memories and their laws, the
latter an imperishable legacy.
Great
conquerors, proud kings and stern warriors
have "by the red light of blazing roofs,
built the rainbow bridge to glory and called
it fame," but athwart their victorious progress has flamed the red bar-sinister of
ruined homes and outraged hearths; amid
the swell of their victorious trumpets has
quavered the piteous cry of the widowed
and fatherless, and the entire happiness of
countless lives has been desolated and
crushed under the wheels of their chariots
and the hoofs of their horses. Far otherwise has been the influence of law and the
fame of lawyers, their power has ever been
weilded for peace and progress; not by the
stern rule of the sword, but by the mild
sway of justice are their victories won, and
their fame is built, not on homes wrecked
but on homes preserved, not lit by the
ruddy glare of blazing homesteads, but by
the flickering light of the furnace of industry, made possible under the just administration of fixed laws. To the influence
of this mighty force and its devotees, thp
gentlemen of the legal profession, on the
world's peace and progress I invite your
attention for a few brief moments this
evening.
The law is to-day recognized as the
foundation ofjustice and liberty. Without
law there can be no recognition of human
freedom, and just laws grow out of and are
themselves the best possible evidence of a
state of true liberty. The words of Pitt,
"where the law ends tyranny begins,"
correctly and clearly point out the great
importance of law to a real enjoyment of
freedom and liberty. The dignity and
splendor of our system of jurisprudence is,
that under its administration the wrongs
of all are speedily redressed, and the rights
of each and every citizen are guaranteed.
In the Halls of Justice the humblest man
is the peer of the proudest, and men may
ask for justice, not with the cringing tone
and fawning mien of those who beg a
king's favor, but with the erect carriage
and clear voice of men asking a man's
rights. The very government under which
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we live, and which effectuates the laws by
which we are ruled, is itself the creation
of law, whose all pervading influence has
been summarized by the immortal Blackstone when he says, "Law is a science
which is universal in its extent, applicable
to each individual, yet comprehending all
things."
Look back on the history of the development of jurisprudence and note how familiar the great lawyers' names will be to
thestudent. The long roll of honor in both
England aiid America is one of which to
be proud. The Hales, Holts, Mansfields
and Erskines, of England, the Marshalls,
Kents, Greenleafs and Choates, of our own
fair land, have alike reflected glory on the
calling they so highly adorned, and the
lawyer of to-day has shown himself to be
a worthy successor to those great dead;
intelligent, upright and manly in conduct,
cherishing a high and delicate sense of individual honor and professional pride, and
displaying at all times a deep regard for
the dignity of hishigh calling and a decorous reverence for the example and counsel
of those illustrious sages who have earned
undying renown.
To be a great lawyer one must be a great
and good man, the moral standard cannot
be too high, for his duty calls him into all
the shifting scenes of life where honor is
most needed and where dishonor can be
most readily concealed.
The man of business, swamped and
overloaded with debt, entangled in a network of misfortune, must seek a lawyer's
aid, and frequently musttrust himself, his
good name, his all, in his counsel's keeping. His secrets, his fears, his very inmost thoughts are all poured out before hii
lawyer, and the law itself forbids the betrayal of the confidence thus obtained.
In the hour of sorrow and distress the
lawyer is sought by th'e widowed and orphaned, his knowledge and his skill is interposed as a buckler of defence between
the fearful, the timid and oppressed and
the rapacious talohs of the oppressor, and
when the trembling culprit stands shivering before the awfulfrontof that justice he
has outraged, it is the lawyer who steadies
the hands that hold the scales and demands for even the guilty the application of
just punishment and not blind, unreason-

ing revenge. Not alone in the active
scenes of life is the lawyer a participant,
but when the sands run low, and the
shadow of the dark valley draws near, he
is called to commit to legal form the last
mortal wishes of the departing onei to preserve his earthly possessions to the object
of his affection, or if perchance the lamp
of life expires before any legal expression
of the will be made, he leaves to law and
the lawyer the welfare of his dear ones and
the distribution of his possessions. Well
might Sir Richard Bethel say, "There is
no other class or order in the community
upon whom so much of human happiness
depends, or whose pursuits and studies are
so intimately connected with the progress
and well being of mankind."
Cases involving the freedom or life of the
accused demand in the lawyer a far seeing
discrimination and an almost omniscient
knowledge. He may be required to face
theindignation ofan unthinking populace,
who frenzied by some awful crime demand
a victim to glut the popular vengeance.
Then must he maintain his integrity at the
sacrifice of popularity or ambition, and, for
the love of justice alone brave with heroic
courage the exuhations of enemies and the
blame of friends. It is his high and inestimable privilege by judicious and seasonable counsel to rescue his clients from the
fangs of merciless cupidity or unmerited
reproach, to defend their characters from
unjust aspersions, no matter how powerful or numerous the assailants may be. It
is then the lawyer's privilege to stand ever
firmly for the right and just cause, to foil
the efforts of the oppressors mind to become
the defenders and upholders of our civil institutions, state and national. Hear the
testimony of Dr. Draper in his "Intellectual Development of Europe," speaking of
the professions of law and medicine, "It. is
to the credit of both these professions that
they never soughta perpetuity of power by
schemes of vast organization; never attempted to delude mankind by stupendous
imposture; never compelled them to desist
from the expression of their thoughts, and
even from thinking by alliance with civil
power. Far from being the determined
antagonists of human knowledge, they
uniformly fostered it and in its trials defended it."
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The new century that is just opening
before us blushes with a rosy morning
promise of a stupendous future. Its predecessor was the greatest century in the
history of the world; in- it were recorded
more and greater achievements for the
human race than in all the eighteen cenituries of the Christian era which preceded
it, and now, in the dawn of this wondrous
twentieth century we go forth to assume
responsibilities, not only to future clients,
but to society, to the world as a whole; we
don the toga of manhood and slip out into
the world, to take our place,hu mble though
it may be, in the ranks of our great profession, there to toil with what ability we
may for the honor of our calling and the
good of the world at large.
American lawyers from the days of John
Alarshail to the present time have always
been prominent in the nation's struggles.
It was a Virginia lawyer who roused the
country's patriotism by his eloquent cries
for liberty. ft wasaNewEnglandlawyer
who in sonorous periods defied the forces
of disunion.
It was an Illinois lawyer
wiho uttered the first words of reconciliation after the great fratricidal struggle was
over, and it is an Ohio lawyer who now
sits in the White House at Washington,
an equal, nay superior, of kings and emperors.
Call the roll of America's famous men
and see the vast percentage of lawyers included in that mighty host. Nor can one
doubt that in the years to come the lawyer
will continue to be the leader in all that
pertains to his country's good or welfare.
Never was the need of able lawyers so
great; never were the questions to be argued and settled so vital, so all important;
never was the field of a lawyer's labor
wider, and never was the opportunity of
winning a nation's honor, a nation's
thanks, greater than in the present centnry. The weighty questions, as to the
status and relations to us of the inhabitants
of the vast lands now fallen under our
sway, the real natureof the tenure by which
we hold the Isles of the far east, and (iur
righltsand liabilities in them and for them,
depend largely on the learning, wisdom
and courage of American statesmen and
lawyers.
With the disappearance of Spain from

the world's stage comes the advent of a
new figure in the world's council, star-eyed
she takes her place on the world's wide
stage and cries aloud the very key note of
her existence, "we stand for liberty not
license, and our motto is ever one for all,
all forone." Surely when the poet's dream
is realized
"When the war drum throbs no longer
And the battle flag is furled
In the Parliament of man, the federation of the
world,"

the brightest figure in all the concourse
will be that of Columbia, and as her starcrowned brow is turned to the heavens.
there shall rise about her the song of a
freed people, freed by the power of her
arms and wisdom of her laws, for in
America's expansion has come untold
blessings to the people who have fallen
under the shelter of herlaws and influence;
and the mightiest agent in procuring thig
great result will not be the American soldier, gallant as he is, but the American
lawyer.
And not only in the wide field of national
expansion must the lawyer play his part,
but the vital questions of the nation's inner
life demand attention and settlement.
The race question, big with all its due
possibilities, dangerous with the latent
power of some great explosive, demands
attention and careful, subtle handling.
The great increase in the number of trusts,
those vast aggregations of capital, the
monopolistic tendency of the age, and the
correlative question, the danger in the
formation of trade unions and strikes, all
demand serious, immediate attention. In
these fields as well as in mere matters of
law, the lawyer must be prominent, and
it will be to his influence more than to
that of any other class or body of men,*that
thqsatisfactory adjustment and settlement
of these great questions will be due.
Law and politics are nece.-sarily in some
degree at least united and few lawyers indeed can avoid more or less intrusion into
the political arena. It is to the honest
lawyer perhaps more than any other person, that the people look for deliverance
from that parasite on the tree of national
government, the boss. Un-American, unrepublican, the boss has gradually gained
control to an alarming extent of our governmental machinery, both state and na-
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This unnatural growth on our
tional.
political life is utterly obnoxious to republican institutions, and unless destroyed
bids fair ere long to make a mockery of our
form of government, and to subvert the
very springs of our national being. Nowhere are honest calpable lawyers needed
more than in the forefront of the attack on
this crying evil of our time.
If the lawyer, then, is to maintain his
high place in the history of our country,
and if he is in the future to be as in the
past, the most promiient figure in thq development of the country's heritage, it is
vitally essential that he should ue a man
of culture and learning, one well trained in
the theory and practice of his profession,
and it was in recognition of this fact that
the gradual evolution, now almost completed, in the method of legal instruction took place. The demand for
comprehensive and systematic trainingled
to the establishment of schools of law
throughout the land, and numbers of the
most prominent figures at American bar
have not hesitated to give their time, labor
and splendid talents to the task of instructing and training the future lawyer of
America.
Among the first of these institutions was
founded our own fair Alma Mater. From
the germ of its humble beginning has
grown the school we know and love so
well, and which we believe to be the best
and foremost institution of its kind in the
Keystone State,and from our Alma Mater's
sheltering arms have gone forth famous
men, noted jurists, and a great host of
honest clever lawyers, the backbone of the
legal profession in this state.
All hoonor and praise should be given to
those who have. made this possible, and
therefore to you, gentlemen of the faculty,
to.you, who have by unwearying effort and
toilsome self-sacrifice, aided, helped and
guided us in our struggle toward a knowledge of the elements of our profession, we
owe the profoundest gratitude, and the
sincerest thanks, ana the recollection of
the many kindnesses we have received at
your hands will be one of the dearest of the
associations thathoveraround the memory
of our Alma Mater.
Perhaps to no class of men does a community owe so much as to the faculty of

an institution of this nature; the welfare
of the nation depends to a large degree on
the character and ability of its Bench and
Bar, and it is to the influence exerted upon
the student by the professor that the future
lawyer's professional standing is largely
due.
No law school in America has a more
painstaking, conscientious and able faculty
than we have, while at its head is one,
who as a lawyer, author and teacher has
won deserved pre-eminence, one whose
learning and untiring industry are known
to the entire Bar of the Commonwealth
and who is remembered with respect and
affection by hosts of alumni who attribute
to his laborious efforts the success which
they have met in their chosen profession.
Now after a period of comradeship during our course of friendly rivalry in the
class-room, of mutual pleasures and successes, after the formation- of numerous
ties of friendship, we stand to-night at the
parting of the ways. It is the last muster,
for hereafter we as'a class shall have
ceased to exist. We cannot but feel regret at the severing of the bonds which
have held us together during our course
here, even while we look forward with the
flush of hope on our brow into that future
which holds for each one of us possibilities
of success or fame, at least we my all vow
that while we may not shed the lustre of
a great name on the rolls of the (lear old
school, yet none of the class of nineteen
hundred and one will ever discredit it, or
cause the sons of Dickinson to blush at our
name. Let us then go forth into the world
unafraid, armed with an invincible resolve
to follow in the footsteps of the great who
have glorified our profession by their lives,
and ever bearing in mind the sage advice
and stirring words of New York's favored
son, Roosevelt: "It is only through strife,
through labor and painful effort, by grim
energy and resolute courage, that we move
on to better things."

SUPREME COURT JUSTICE J. HAY BROWN.

THE FORUM.
THE BACCALAUREATE ADDRESS.
(Delivered by Justice J. Hay Brown.IL,.

D., of the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.)

By divine appointment we are destined

to struggle. From our first to our latest
breath, the struggle of existence is the
struggle to succeed. With the first breath.
of independent physical life, the babe unconsciously begins the struggle to succeed
in living, and, with the gradual developmeat of mind and body, struggle never
ceases. On the playground, among his
fellows, the boy strives for leader-hip ;. in
the school-room, his ambition is for first
place in his class; as his years mature, at
college and university, tosucceed in general excellenceand attainments, or in those
of some special course, is every student's
worthy aim that will not down; and, after
awhile, with school days amid co lege terms
behind him, having attained to the stature
of full manhood, and become equipped for
the life-work of his choice, he commences
with buoyant hope and inspiring confidence that success awaits him. This
is true, whatever be man's sphere in life.
The young farmer so begins to till his
fields; the mechanic to ply his trade; the
merchant to sell his wares; the banker to
lend his money; the physician to bear
healing to thesick; the minister to preach
Christ and save souls, and the lawyer to
participate in the administration of justice
among his fellow-men. Sooner or later,
the hopes of early nianhood are followed
by realization or disappointnfent, and, by
the samedecree that, in thesweat of man's
face he shall eat his bread, it seems that
the full measure of earthly success is to
come to the few and disappointment to
the mny. But, though the heart, undaunted at the beginning of a struggle for
the attainment of success, at last yields to
crushing disappointments, an aim to succeed stilllingers; for, when hope of success here has forever fled, and the shadows
of the evening begin to come, then, if not
before, the disappointed soul takes new
hope in the thought that, by a properly
directed life, he may, in the end, succeed
in the attainmentof happiness in the world
beyond.
To succeed being the normal aim of life,
the conditions under which success may
be achieved, whether individual activity
be in a moral, intellectual or material
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sphere, ought to be understood. Ignorance and disregard of them lead only to
failure; knowledge of and compliance with
theia, to sure success. Truer words were
never spoken than that every man is the
architect of his own fortune; and he who
fails need blame none but himself. In
the end, he so knows the truth from his
own conscience. It seems to me that I
may not inappropriately on this occasion
speak of sorne of the conditions of success
in the great profession so dear to many of
us, learned by observation in the career of
activity in it for almost a generation, and
I have, therefore, chosen as my theme, if
I may so term it, "Some of the Conditions
of a Lawyer's Success."
Who is the successful lawyer? What is
the proper measure of his success? What
is its correct standard? It is not merely
the gathering of clibntsabout him and the
winning of their causes; it is not the accumulation of wealth, nor tie exercise of
power; nor is it eminence in public station. These are not to be disregarded or
lightly considered; for, in the fullness of
time, they may come to be the legitinmate
evidence of a well-rounded career, strc,,uously, faithfully and consistently pursued, and crowned with triumph. The
successful lawyer, to whoni come public
confidence and esteem, honor and respect
among his fellows, renown as the friend of
right and the foe of wrong, competence to
his household and peace to his conscience,
is he who is loyal to his high profession;
who knows that it stands for the administration of justice upon the earth; who
feels that, above all other considerations,
must be his sincerity and zeal in the work
he has undertaken; who pleads for no
man's cause that is not just and defies ihe
world for him whose is; and who, with
clear and intelligent comprehension of the
great principles of truth and right, helps
to make more enduring the foundations
upon which society and good government
rest. It was of such a lawyer that Mr.
Webster spoke when he said: "Justi-e is
the great interest of man on earth. It is
the ligament which holds civilized natures and civilized beitgs together.
Wherever her temple stands, and so long
as it is duly honored, there is a foundation for social security, general happiness,
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and tile improvement and progress of our
race; and whoever labors on its edifice with
usefulness and distinction, whoever clears
its foundations, strengthens its pillars,
adorns its entablatures, or contributes to
raise its dome still higher in the skies, conncets himself. his name, and his fame, and
his character, with that which is, and is
bound to be, t lie frame of human society."
First iu order, and surely i n importance,
among the conditions of success, is aptitude for the profession. By this I mean
the genius that marks him who possesses
it as naturally directed towards the study
of those problems that underlie the science
of the law and to the exercise of those
qualities which its practice demands. He
starts in the race with long advantage
who, at the outset of his career, has a
mind alert to comprehend and active to
pursue, with fullness to contain and the
tenacity to hold, the fundamental principles of order, government and law. The
natural power to inquire and investigate,
to balance and to judge, joined with decision and executive quality, is preeminently the inheritance of the "born
lawyer," if lawyers can ever fairly be
said to be "born." Though the Goddess
of Wisdom was reputed to have sprung
full-armed from the brain of Jove, the
magic phenomena of mythology are not
often repeated, and, while it can hardly
be said of the lawyer as of him whose
tuneful notes come unbidden, "Arscitur
non fit," still it is so true that weall know
it, that the young man, who, without natural fitness for the study and practice of
the law, no matter what his general attainnients may be, undertakes to enter the
profession, is deluded in his expectation
of winning success; and the ambition that
directs him to struggle for the laurels of
the forum directs him into a hopeless contest. If this were better known, the responsibility for the failure of sons would
rest upon fewer fathers.
Aptitude is not always instantly discernible, and there need be no discouragement
at the start over the apparent lack of it, if
the young man feels t.hat his place is at the
Bar; for, if it exists, it will be disclosed.
Let him not falter hutil, after honest effort,
he has learned to know himself and that
his is some other sphere in life. Let him

remember that perseverance in study, culture and practice have disclosed the superior legal genius of many and the supreme
aptitude of some who have achieved greatness at the bar and eminence on the bench;
and let him not forget that what often
seems aptitude in the beginning is soon
found to be fitness for something else than
the law, and, not infrequently, for failure
in any walk of life. No man can succeed
who is not true to hiniself and frank with
his conscience; and, if the student of the
law, in his preparatory years, or the active
practitioner, before it is too late, after honest and patient, and not feverish and fitful
efforts to learn the truth finds he has no
natural fitness for the profession, let him
leave it and struggle elsewhere for success;
but, in so leaving it, let him not depart
with discouragement following disappoin tment, but rather let hini remember that
his ambition is and ought to be still to succeed. Let him remember that he has aptitude for useful work in some sphere of
life; and, if determined to succeed, lie will
find his natural fitness in some other calling, denied him for the profession of his
first choice and which he imagined was
his first and only love. Let him recall the
names lustrous on the roll of lawyers who
bad failed as physicians; of the shining
lights in the sacred ministry, with many
saved souls to their credit, who, in the
Courts, as lawyers, had never won a client's
cause; and of the many who have attained
unmeasured success as men of affairs in
some particular sphere of human activity
after having been denied it in avother, because not naturally fitted for it. Gamaliel,
in the Sanhedrim at Jerusalem, was a
learned lawyer. So were others, but their
niames iave perished from the earth and
the records of that high court have faded
away. His alone has come down to us
through twenty centuries, to be borne upon the lips of mien through all of those yet
to come, because Saul of Tarsus sat at his
feet to learn the law; but preceptor and
pupil would be among the unremembered
of their time if a great light had not led
Paul to become the preacher 9nd apostle,
the resplendentglory of whose name shines
as the sun, forever.
The great advantage of aptitude, without which success cannot come, is, how-
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ever, but the advantage of being able to
become equipped for the profession, and
the next condition in order is proper preparation and equipment for its studies.
The law is justly regarded as one of the
learned professions-so the masses look
upon it-and, if it is ever to be lowered it
should be at other hands than ours. We
ought to feel that the best equipment for
it is that broad and generous culture of
the humanities, which has stood the test
of long experience, despite the practical,
utilitarian and scientific trend of modern
thought and education. Ithasnotyetbeen
demonstrated that any stheme of educational training lays so good a foundation
for substantial success as the well
approved, systematic study of the classics,
mathematics, natural science, history
and philosophy-for the educated lawyer
must be the educated man-and I cannot
subscribe to the eml)hasis placed by some
on the paramount importance of thestudy
of social sciences in preparing to study the
law. The broader culture to which I have
referred means the best equipment for the
study and the practice of the law, and as
an incident to such culture will come the
consideration of other questions and problems connected with our social life, to be
all the more intelligently taken up by the
mind cultured and broadened in the school
that the experience of years has declared
to be the best. An hour's communion
with Socrates and Plato in the groves of
Athens is worth more to him who would
study the law than weary nights with
Spencer's "Social Statics." He who goes
to the Delphic oracles, listens to the whispering branches of Dodona's sacred oak,
dreams under the music of Apollo's lyre,
or listens with terror to the clangor of his
silver bow in avenging the wrongs of his
priest, or follows Xneas from sacked Troy
over the seas tempest-tossed by Juno's
cruel wrath, until Italy and the Lavinian
coasts are reached, whence sprang "the
Alban Sires and the walls of lofty Rome,"
comes to the study of the law better fitted
than he who quotes John Stuart Mill;
and, in the "Progress and Poverty" of
Henry George therecannot be found what
is learned from Newton, Hume and Gibbon, Agassiz and Henry, Shakespeare,
Milton and the Bible. Comparison of

broad, liberal, classical culture with any
other need go no further, for there is no
substitution for it as the proper prelinminary training for either of the learned profesions. I am not to be understood as
intending to say that without such early
training, success will not come to the lawyer; fbr, among those who have achieved
the highest distinction a; counsellors and
advocates, have been, an(l are, those to
whom privileges and opportunities were
denied in early life. Though, so denied
by birth or fortune, their compensation
has been supreme genius-genius to work,
genius to study and learn, where others
would be blind in ignorance, genius to
succeed-and they are the just pride of
the profession. If I speak to any such tonight, who, by his own unaided efforts,
has won success, has supplemented in
later life the neglected education of his
youth, and now tells his children, in their
homes of comfort, that his inspiration to
succeed came from the vantage ground of
his early poverty, he will, I know, give
his son, as the proper training for the
study of lav, the early liberal education
which he missed and has seen turled to
tile advantage of so many.
Whatever plan of professional study is to
be next pursued, whether in law school or
office, I have long been assured that none
can be effective which ignores or dwarfs
the importance of those elementary works
of the masters, whose commentaries on the
civil and the common law are their oracles.
From them and front them alone can be
learned the science of the law. In the lecture rooms of college and university, faithful teachers of the law are imparting wisdom to those striving to learn it, and
words of too high praise cannot be spoken
of what is there accomplished; but the
words of the lecturer will fall with no
profit on theears of his hearers unless they
qualify themselves to hear what he says,
by tireless and unremitting study in the
seclusion of closet or office of what the
masters have written. By such study and
by it alone can the reasons of the law be
learned, the value of its maxims known
and the force of its great principles impressed. With no disparagement of the
law school, but with avowed high appreciation of what it does, it is but the truth
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to say that, even without its great advantages, the worthy youth can still, as before
it was known, become the trained lawyer,
but only through severe aud individual
study, secluded and alone, taught by great
teachers, who though dead, speak through
their living pages. With all the aid and
advantages that certainly come to him
who can enjoy them in the law school, it
must never be forgotten that ad astrawill
always beper a.'pera. No greater service
can be rendered to the student of the law
in the period of his equipment for its practice than to impress upon him the value
ofaknowledgeof its reasons, of its maxims,
of its great general principles, to belearned
only from the sources indicated, and of the
utter superficiality of mere familiarity with
cases and precedents; for the law is not an
exactscience. If it was, many ceurts could
be dispensed with, and the unlearned in
the law could administer it through precedents and decided cases. No law school
made Marshall; but, by his self-acquired
knowledge of its reasons and mastery of its
fundamental principles, in his high office,
he could unerringly tell his colleagues what
the righteous judgment of their high court
should be, and turn with confidence to the
learned Story to produce the cases to support it. Many other'examples than that
of the great Chief Justice might be given
to illustrate the paramount and absolutely
controlling importance of the individual
effort and study of the law by the student
and his thorough familiarity with T egreat
text writers and commentators. But in
passing, I shall recall, only to emphasize
what I have said, the words of the gifted
Black, whose genius as lawyer, judge and
statesman shed lustre at the bar, on the
bench and in the councils of the nation.
It wag my privilege to know him from my
boyhood until he died, less than a score of
years ago, and from friendly interest in me,
his words once were, worth repeating now:
"My boy, if you have read Blackstone
through and through, know Chitty well,
and have learned Broom's legal maxims,
you are about readyZ to be a lawyer." This
may have been extravagant, but there
was much truth in the utterance.
Pr.ofoundly, though, as the career of the
successful lawyer will be impressed and
influenced by instructions from judicious

books and schools in his preparation for
practice, practical knowledge mu.t not be
overlooked. Knowledge is learned from
books for its practical application; but it
is usele.,s to him who has it unless he has
knowledge of men and experience with
them and the matters of every-day life.
The habit of practical observation should
be cultivated and ordinary principles of
every-day business carefully noted; for the
motives which influence men in the current affairs have great significance to hini
who must deal with witnesses, jurors, and
even judges. Again and again, in the
contests at the bar and in the deliberations of the Court, a practical knowledge
of the different branches of business, of
commercial industries, and even of political activity, comes to the relief of him who
grapples with vexatious professional problems. The reports of adjudicated cases
furnish forceful and brilliant illustrations
of lessons learned by the expositors of the
law in the business office, at the desk of
the teacher, behind the trade-counter, in
the workshop, or on the farm.
At last, certified by diploma or Board of
Examiners, the student takes the oath of
his high office, that he will support the
Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the Commonwealth, that
he will behave himself in the office of attorney within the Court, according to the
best of his learning and ability, and with
all good fidelity as well to the Court a- to
the client; that he will use no falsehood
nor delay any person's cause for lucre or
malice, and is then announced to the
world as a lawyer. He counts but lightly,
however, on the chances of a professional
career who rests confident of success upon
mere adequacy of equipment, natural or
acquired; for, emphasize the importance
of aptitude and training as well we may,
success is yet to be gained, and the value
of the most complete preparation is to be
exploited, in the wide field of practice.
The first exaction made upon the lawyer
who seeks the highest end of professional
exertion is singleness of devotion to the
law. She is indeed a jealous mistress, tolerant of love for no other, and he who
strives for what she has to give must give
himself wholly up to her. Frowns come
to the suitor for her timiles and favors who,
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under her watchful eye, is caught coquetting with aniother; but she gives every
lover a chance upon the one condition,
that he worthily love her alone, and, with
no sentiment, reminds him:
"The man who seeks one thing in life, and but one,
May hope to achieve it before life be done;
But he who seeks all things, wherever he goes.
Only reaps from the hopes which around him he
sows,

A harvest of barren regrets."

There must be patience, too, in wooing
and waiting for the favors of the law.
There must be no fretting that clients do
not come at once and complaint that
friends do not help to bring them to the
ofice. If the office is fit to receive them
and its occupant to care for them, they
will find their own way to it in time,
never to leave it; but he who frets and
complains that business has not come to
him, instead of, with patience and perseverance, qualifying himself the better for
it when it (toes come, will never get it,
because he will not deserve it. I am not
sure that it is well for clients to come
rapidly; but it rather seems to me that,
if they come slowly, their lawyer can better qualify himself to serve them and
others and to win coufidence, which
spreads with certain results.
To two particular allurements the active
practitioner is most liable; and their strain
is so seductive that, like the mariner of
Grecian story, he must seal his ears to its
ravishing music. One of these is the attraction for political office. The function
of the lawyer naturally makes him the
spokesman of his party, and he is easily
drawn into the whirlpool of that intensely
interesting and absorbing passion, which,
supplemented with popular applause, the
clamor of the multitude, the triumph of the
hour, and all the attractiveness of public
falne, sweeps
vay cool judgment, and
with it his general interest in himselfai)d
his client. There have been undoubtedly
great statesmen who were great lawyers,
and, besides the exalted office of the judge,
that of popular representative--to be the
tribune or executive of the people-is the
fit aspiration of a lawyer's career; but it
must come as the end and reward of professional success, and not as a means to it.
When will young lawyers learn this truth.
When will they know that a struggle for

preferment in political life before it has
been reached in the profession means failure in both? When I recall the many
lives so full of early promise among us that
have gone out in bitter disappointment in
the strifes of politics, I would that some
one could come trumpet-tongued to every
youthful lawyer as he starts on his career
to tell their story for its warning.
To the lawyer who deals largely with
business and commercial interests, there is,
secondly, a constant fascination in the
greater monetary rewards of other vocations than his own and a temptation to divide-his time and talents between his professional labors and outside interests. In
chance instances, the experiment is not altogether disastrous, and, in rare cases, it
may prove profitable; but, with authenticated exceptions, the rule remains that
the successful legal adviser of varied business interests should keep himself aloof
from them. Individual financial failure
or failureof business enterprises with which
the lawyer may be induced to become connected discredits him in his high profession. He should, however, be thrifty and
steadily strive for the accumulation of
competence, always remembering, however, that his aim in life is not the getting
of money. If he deserves to succeed and
wins success, palt of it is pecuniary reward
and a deserved reputation for soundness of
business judgment is no mean element in
it. Such reward brings-with it professional
and judicial.independence, and to his safe
and sure investments the lawyer can turn
for the substantial comfort and happiness
of himself and family and for assured freedom from fretful care for ,the morrow.
Harassed and annoyed financially, man's
usefulness in any sphere is immeasurably
impaired, and, at times, totally destroyed.
The lawyer should ever guard against such
embarrassments and remember that upon
his thrift he must largely depend for an
undisturbed mind, for coolness of judg-'
ment and for his ability to give unbroken
attention to his clients' interests. Next to
man's duty to so live as to be at peace with
himself is that -f-acquiring, not only an.
umblemished name, but an estate as well;
for the world presents no sadoer spectacle
than poverty in old age after neglected opportunities in the noontide of life. This
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should never be forgotten, and by observing prudence and avoiding profligacy, the
lawyer who succeeds in his profession will
succeed to an estate, adequate, at least, to
his needs. On the other hand, let him remember that, if his pride is in his profession and his aim is for a name in it that
may linger and, perhaps, not die, he must
strive for success in it alone; for, when
tempted by the prospect of greater gain
elsewhere, his devotion to his profession
wanes, and his hands reach out for silver
and gold, no matter how high his rank at
the bar or exalted his eminence on the
bench, he begins to be forgotten as a lawyer and quickly passes to the unremembered of his day.
The singleness of devotion which binds
the lawyer to his profession must likewise
be a supreme devotion to the law itself, as
distinguished at times from the immediate
cause of his client. He is a minister in a
sacred temple and his oath binds him and
his conscience to its 'service at all times.
Loyalty to his client's cause demands, to
the utmost that the law permits, his protection of interest in life, liberty and property but no more; and he must find such
protection for his client in the law, which
is but another name forjustice, good morals
and social order; and, if it cannot be found
there it does not exist. Devotion to the
law itself means devotion to its fair and
honest interpretation at all times, with
face immovably set against any cunning
reading of it, or any improper, ingenious
reasoning from it, to defeat an adversary
or to win a client's cause. It means that
for no man's cause and for no consideration will the upright lawyer lend his talents to the prostitution of the law, and
the inspiration of his career of success is:
"Pro clientibus saepe; pro lege semper."
Devoted to the law itself, he who contributes to keep right or set right its landmarks. and, as new problems are presented, aids to solve them, according to the
principles of righteousness and good government, who discerning the deficiencies
of the statute, supplies them, or, detecting
its errors, corrects them, makes a contribution to his profession; and, as such labors
are of general or limited concern, achieves
a greater or less degree of success. No one
can hope to reap the reward of a success-

ful career who refuses to submit nimself
to the condition that his duty to hisclient
must be subordinated to his duty of cooperating in the effort to administer justice. I am well aware that deflections
from this standard are difficult to avoid,
and when embarrassment comes to the
lawyer in determining whether service to
his client will be infidelity to the law, he
must rely upon his intelligence and conscience to rightly direct him. In this
connection, speaking of the lawyer's dutyto subordinate his interest in his client to
his interest in the law, I may not inappropriately refer to his duty of subordinating the client to himself. He must
ever control his client and insist upon
compliance with what he directs to be
done. Frequently, the client; through ignorance or prejudice, is actually blind to his
own real interests, and the lawyer, when so
convinced, who has not the courage to cornnmand him intoobedience to his directions,
who dallies with him and makes excuse for
him, by saying be cannot control him, is a
coward. He fears, who should be feared
and respected. Without dwelling longer
on this, let me only say that he serves his
client best who never hesitates to frankly,
fearlessly and manfully advise what ought
to be done, and to insistthat his advice be
followed. This is the duty of the adviser
to the advised. To be advised, the client
seeks his counsel, and expects to be guided
by his judgment. It were well if this
were better understood.
Absolute-fide'ity to the court is not only
the first and controlling duty of an attorney, but one of the absolute essentials to
his success. The obligation of his oath
commits him sacredly to it, and whatever
ma be achieved by violation of that obligation is sure failure, if not revealed disgrace. By the prostitution of the profession and its privileges, clients may be satisfied and others gained; fees may be
earned: verdicts may be wrested from
juries and judgments won from courts, but
no true standard of success will tolerate
results that do not more firmly establish
the administration of the law on the
foundations of right and justice. Fidelity
to the court means frankness with it at all
times; absolute candor in every statement
made to it; proffers to it the results of pro-
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fessional learning and research to aid it in
its deliberations; constant concern for the
maintenance of its dignity and honor, and
unwavering co-operation with it in the
effort to administer the law for the attainment of justice. What such fidelity means
to the court none but the judge can know.
By inspiring mutual confidence, it makes
both bench and bar the better; it increases
the usefulness and effectiveness of the
former, and raises the standard of the latter; and the lawyer faithless in this duty
never knows success.
I am next brought to a consideration of
moral character as a condition of success;
and, by moral character, I mean Christian
moral character. The standard of that
morality is found in the precepts of the
great law-giver of God's chosen people and
in the teachings of theFounder of our later
Christian system of truth. With all due
regard for religious tolerance, it is a matter
pf judicial notice that we are a Christian
people, and that Christianity is part of the
law of our land. The American lawyer
enters upon his career among a Christian
people; he springs from the loins of Christian parents, and he is reared in the Christian faith. He may not be denied success
in professional life because not actually
identified with some church; but he dare
not defy the Christian religion, or utterly
ignore it in his daily walk and conversation. Around and about him on all sides
are Christians. His lot is cast among
them, and his clients must come from
them. But, without high moral character, no matter what other qualities the
lawyer may possess, abiding confidence
from the public will not go out to him, and
without such confidence success cannot
come. The highest standard of morality,
I repeat, is found in the Christian religion,
and as above aptitude, equipment and singleness of devotion to the law is high
moral character as a condition of success
in it, the lawyer must turn for the development of such character where he will
most certainly find it-in Christianity, in
the Christianity which is part of the law
of his land, part of the law to which, that
he may succeed, he devoles himself and
his life. We, perhaps, unless reminded,
forget from time to time how the Christian religion is interwoven with our whole

-ystem of government. The greatest constitutional lawyer of his age has said:
"There is nothing that we look for with
more certainty than this general principle, that Christianity is part of the law of
the land. This was the case among the
Puritans of New England, the Episcopalians of the Southern States, the Pennsylvania Quakers, the Baptists, the mass of
the followers of Whitefield and Wesley,
and the Presbyterians all brought and all
adopted this great truth, and all have sustained it. And where there is any religious sentiment amongst men at all, this
sentiment incorporates itself with the law.
Everything declares it. The massive cathedral of the Catholic; the Episcopalian
church, with its lofty spire pointi,,g
heavenward; the plain temple of the
Quaker; the log church of the hardy pioneer of the wilderness; the mementos aad
memorials around and about us; the consecrated graveyards, their tombstones and
epitaphs; their silent vaults, their moldering contents; allattestit. The dead prove
it as well as the living. The generations
that are gone before speak to 'it, and pronounce it from the tomb. We feel it.
All, all, proclaim that Christianity, general, tolerant Christianity, Christianity independent of sects and parties, that Christianity to which the sword and the fagot
are unknown, general, tolerant Christianiity, is the law of the land." And there
still lingers among the living an illustrious
Chief Justice of the highest court of our
own Commonwealth, who has spanned
nearly a century of life, and who, after he
had reached four score years and ten, and
strength had still been vouchsafed to him,
declared, in speaking of the settlement of
our Atlantic coast: "In our northern half,
whethersettled by Swede or Dutch,French
or Saxon, these settlers came under the
sovereignty of Christian kings; and
brought with them their religion as well
as their possessions. They set up here no
pagan, infidel or unknown gods, but,
strengthened by Christian prayer,, and
elevated by Christian song, they erected
on the strand, and in the wilderness, the
Christian.altar, and laid upon it the sacrifice, not of beasts or birds, but of true
and faithful hearts, bathed in a Savior's
redeeming love. This continent, there-
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fire, became Christian when first discovered and settled." With such words from
these great lawyers, whose lives have exeinplified that high standard of morality
to which I have referred, and whose

supireme success in the forum, the Senate
und on the bench has become part of the
history of the State and nation, wiho will
set for himself any lower standar d?
I have referred to what may be justly regarded as the essential conditions of success. There are others, however, which,
if not mentioned, might be properly considered. I would refer to the importance
of such a life among his fellows that the
fullest confidence will come to the lawyer
from those from whom he most wishes it
to come-his brothers in the law; and I
would speak of what such confidence
means, spreading through the lawyers to
all the community for which they stand;
I would speak of that evidence of the
highest confidence of man in man, to be
found only in our profession, in which the
words of a lawyer's lips are and ought to
be a sealed covenant, and to tell how the
words of his mouth are an obligation not
to be broken; that in contact with men in
the trial of causes and in the examination
of witnesses to ascertain the truth the lawyer should b6 evermindful that his fellowman is truthful and does not willingly bear
false witness; that tedious and undue
cross-examination of the witness on the
stand is understood by the jury to be in
effort to swerve him from (he truth-these
and many other thoughts come to me, to
be uttered in the hope that I may helpfully speak them to some one who hears
me; but the passing hour will not permit.
I can only add that, complying with the
conditions of which I have spoken, no
lawyer need fearfailure, but can look hopefully forward to success.
A quarter of a century ago one, who was
easily first among men, who had achieved
honor and renown in his profession, and
the highest eminence in the highest court
of the Commonwealth, thus spoke to the
great bar of Philadelphia, though not of
its number: "The Bar-its associations
and fellowships; its knightly and courteous contests ; its brilliant display of wit
and eloquence, of mental acumen and forensic learning; its love of right and manly

independence; its kindly and ingenuous
friendships-these are time true love of the
lawyer, the guardian of his early ambition
and the guiding star of his hope."
To these words may I add that success
at the bar means success in those knightly
contests for the right; participation in
those displays of wit and eloquence, of
mental acumen and forensic learuing; a
share in that love of right and manly independence; enjoyment of those kindly
and ingenuous friendships; and it means
what has always seemed to me to be worth
more than all of these-peace in the evening with those who were with us in the
arena through the day; for, out of our contests and rivalries, come neither wounds
that last nor broken bonds of brotherhood.
At twilight we cover the fires of each day's
strife with the ashes of forgetfulness and
charity, to be, perhaps, rekindled in the
morning-but to burn only through the
day until the last nightshallcome. Such
success deserves ambition to succeed.

MOOT COURT.
ELDRED'S ESTATE.
Act 1855-M4feaning of calendarmonth.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Win. Eldred died 9 A. m., August 11,
1889, leaving a will executed 6 P. Dr., July
11, JlS9, in which he devised S25,000 to be
invested for the support ofa Tuesday evening religious service forever in the church
(Protestant Episcopal) of which he was a
member. The service he directed to consist of readings, hymns, prayers, and the
Holy Communion, and he stated that his
object was to secure benefits for himself
after death, provision for such posthumous
service being in his opinion a propitiation
to the Almighty. On distribution of the
estate the residuary legation contended
that the legacy was void and demanded
the money. The executor denied the validity of any legislation that hampered a
testator's gifts to religion and denied that
the gift was within any prohibition.
E. A. DELANEY and LORD for the residuary legatees.
1. The charitable bequest is void. A
calendar month is one which is of unequal
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length according to the calendar, and of
which twelve months make a year. 6 S.
& R. 539, 3 S & R. 169; Parker's Estate, 14
W. N. C. 566.
SCHANZ and CRARY contra.
The bequest isvalid. A calendar month
means thirty days. Shapley v. Gary. 6 S.
& R. 539; Thomas v. Shoemaker, 6 W. &
S. 179.
The bequest is not a charitable but a religious one.
OPINION OF TIE COURT.

The point to be decided in this case is,
did the testator die within thirty (30) days
after making the will?
The act of 1855, 11 see. P. L. Digest, Vol.
1 537, says, "No estate, real or personal,
shall hereafter be bequeathed, demised or
conveyed to any body politic, or any person
in trust for religious or charitable use, except the same be done by deed or will attested by two creditable and at the same
time two disinterested witness at least one
calendar month before the decease of the
testator or alienor, and all disposition of
property contrary hereto shall be void and
go to the residuary legatees or demisees,
next of kin or heirs according to law.
That this is a charitable or religious use
I have no doubt, but granting that it is,
that will not make it void if executed
more than thirty (30) days before the testator's death.
The testator died August l1th, 1899, at 9
o'clock A. if., leaving a will executed at 6
o'clock P. ih., July Ilth, 1899. Had the
testator lived until 6 o'clock P. 3r., August
11th, he would have lived 31 full days
after making his will.
In computing the time the day on which
the act was done must be excluded. Act
June 20th, 1883; Harker v. Adds, 4 Pa. 515;
McCready v. McGonem, 1 Kulp 475.
Deducting the 11 days from July we still
have 20 days, adding the 11 days in August
we have 31. To be more explicit, the
thirty (30) days were up on the 10th of
August at 6 P. Br., but he did not die until
the next day at 9 A. M. which gives us 15
hours over the thirty (30) days, from 9 A.
m. till 6 P. m. is 9 hours, subtracting -that
from 24 leaves 15 hours, therefore we find
the testator actually lived 30 days and 16
hours after the execution of the will, sufficient time to take it out of the statute.
The law does not regard fractions of a

day. fDuffy v. Ogden, 64 Pa. 240; Shlingbift v. Shoemaker, 2 W. N. C. 67; Bank v.
Bank, 11 Mass. 204.
A calendar month is a month of 30 days
and not as the plaintiff contended that
varies with the calendar. Rymen's Appeal, 93 Pa. 142; Thomas v. Shoemaker, 6
U. S. 179.
After a careful perusal of the authority
cited by the plaintiffs that "a calendar
month is one that is of unequal length according to the calendar or ahnanae and of
which 12 make a year," I cannot find anything in them that sustain that view.
In 6 S. &. R. cited by counsel for plaintiffs, C. J. Gibson says, "In England the
month was considered lunar but they have
ceased to so regard it, and at least- in this
country where the popular understanding
on the subject is so entirely changed that
in all translations and business of life, the
month is universally estimated by the
calendar; the lunarmonth never enters into
the consideration of anyone." 6 S. &. R.
540.
As the act expressly states agiftto charity is void if made within thirty (30) days
and we find he has lived more than the
statutory period, we mustsustain the will.
Judgment for the defendant.
ALOYSIUS C. MCINTIRE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

The act of April 26, 1855. 1 P. & L. 1444,
makes void all devises to any person in
trust for religious or charitable uses, unless the will be made "at least one calendar
month before the decease of the testator."
Eldred's will was written and executed at
6 P. M. on July 11th, 1889. He died at 9
o'clock A. MI. on August llth, 188.9.
A "calendar month" is in this case the
space between the day of the execution of
the will and the same day of the nextsucceeding month. If the will had been executed on Feb. 3, a calendar month would
have elapsed with March 3rd.
The will
having been made on July 11th, the following calendar mouth expired on August
l1th. The learned court.below is in error
in saying that "a calendar month is a
month of 30 days." The Standard Dictionary p. 267 correctly names as a second
sense of calendar month, "a period equivalent to a month, as from Jan. 15th to Feb.
15th." Parker's Estate, 14W. N. 566.
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It is no less clear we think, that a full
calendai month would run fron the hour
and minute of the day on which the event
from which the computation is to be made
to the same hour and minute on the same
day of the next following mouth. The
will was written at 6 o'clock it lihe afternoon of July 11th. A calendar month
would elapse at 6 o'clock !itthe afternoon
of August 11th.
The learned court below does not seem to
have adverted to the expression in the act
of April 26th, 1855, "at least one calendar
month." The death of Eldred took place
at 9 o'clock in the morning of August 11th.
That was fifteen hoursless than a calendar
month. The act requires that the making
of the will precede the death "at least one
calendar mouth." It may precede by six
or three or two, it must precede by at least
one calendar month. The death of Eldred
did not do so.
There are cases in which fractions of a
day are treated as a full day or are ignored
altogether. This is not a case, we think,
for the adoption of a similar policy. The
contest is between the heir and the devisee.
If either is to be favored it is the former.
The act of 1855 was intended to protect the
heir from disherison, by a will 'procured
from ove who was enfeebled by disease and
possibly unduly influenced by solicitations
to buy his soul's peace at the expense of
his wife and children or other kin. We
think we carry out the policy of the state
in requiring the full period in this case of
31 days to elapse between the making of
the will and the testator's death.
The constitutionality of the act has been
but feebly attacked. The constitution of
Pennsylvania does not prohibit legislation
that limits the amount of property to be
devoted to religious uses. Although it is
declared with the magniloquence so frequently characteristic of constitutions invented on this continent, whether AngloSaxon or Hispano-American, that "no himan authority can, in any case whatever,
control or interfere with the rights of conscience," 1 P. & L. 42, the courts may be confidently expected to refuse to consider th2
spending of one's money, posthumously,
even for one's soul's salvation, a right of
conscience. Should a Seventh Day Baptist or a Jew unfortunately feel it a duty to

work on the first (lay of the week, he
would be prom ptly advised thathe had no
right to such a sense of duty. Should he
practice bigamy or expropriate others of
their goods, on a plea, however honest,
that his conscience required him to do so,
he would be plainly taught that the will
of the state was the sovereign even of his
conscience. In Rhymer's Appeal, 93 Pa.
142, Sterrett, J,, expresses the opinion that
"it has never been doubted that the act,"
i.e. of ]855 "is constitutional."
We think the devise to thechurch void,
and that the money embraced in it is payable to the residuary legatee.
Decree reversed, with procedendo.
HORACE ANDERSON vs. VESUVIUS

FIRE INSURANCE CO.
Insurable intrest of owner of premises in
house being erectedthereon by contractor.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Action on policy of insurance to recover
damages alleged to have been caused by
fire to 3 houses in process of construction
for plaintiff.
The houses were being
erected on land of the plaintiff by a contractor, the terms of the contract being
that the contractor was to furnish the materials and build the house., to complele
them by a time specified, for a specified
sum to be paid within 10 days after their
completion. At the time of the fire the
houses were nearly complete, but no payment had been made to the contractor.
W. E. ELmES and J. H. RHODES for
plaintiff..
The plaintiff had an insurable interest
in the buildings. Foley v. Ins. Co., 152
N. Y. 131; Crittenden v. Ins. Co., 2 Forum
27: Riggs v. Ins. Co., 12.5 N.Y. 7; Ellnaker
v. Ins. Co., 5 Pa. 183; Ins. Co. v. Robinson,
51; Pa. 256; Ins. Co. v. Meekes, 10 W. N.
C. 306.
V, H. TRUDE and F. CONiY for defendant.
The destruction of the buildings caused
a loss to the contractor and not to the
plaintiff. Not having nn insurable interest-the plaintiff canmot recover. Ins. Co.
v. Turnpike Co., 122 Pa. 37; Sweeney v.
Ins. Co., 20 Pia. 337.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The houses insured were being erected
on land of the plaintiff and were nearly
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complete at the time of the fire. The ownership of the land carried with it the ownership of the structures as they progressed,
which, according to the general rule of law
became part of the realty by annexation
(Crest v. Jack, 3 Watts 238.). There was
no intention on the part of either the
owner or the contractor to sever the ownership of the structures from the ownership
of the land while the work was in progress
or that the contractor should retain title to
the materials put into the buildings until
completion or until paid for by the owner
of the land. That the improvements may
have cost the owner nothing, that le
would not be bound to pay for the work
done or materials furnished, or that the
builder may still remain liable to the owner
on the contract, does not make these
structures any the less a part of the realty,
and as a part of the realty they constitute
an interest at once real, substantial and
insurable, Foley v. Manufacturers' Fire
Ins. Co., 152" N. Y. 131; Crittenden v.
Farmers' Ins. Co., 2 Forum 27; Oakmn
v. Dorchester Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 98
Mass. 57; Sweeny v. The Franklin Fire
Ins. Co., 20 Pa. 337.
Judgment is therefore entered for the
plaintiff
WARREN L.

SHIPMAN, J.

CHARLES CLEMENTS vs. MARY A.
WELSH.
Divorce-Misrepresentationas to having
been ;narriedpreviously, as ground for
divorce.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The defendant, whose husband by whom
she had a child, had procured a divorce
from her in California on the ground of
desertion, became a resident of Pennsylvania, where she became pregnant by
plaintiff. In a conversation between them
she represented that she had never been
married. She gave birth to a child and
Subseafterwards they were married.
qnently he learned of the earlier marriage
but upon being told that the first husband
had died before the second marriage, he
continued to cohabit with her. Later,
upon learning that first husband was still
living and had been divorced from his

wife, he ceased to cohabit with her, and
now sues for decree of nullity of marriage.
J.WATSON and L.DELANEY for libellant.
The marriage was procured by fraud and
the petitionerisentitled to a divorce. Act
8th May, 1854, 1 P. & L. Dig. 1634; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen (Mass.) 605.
C. S. KLINE and A. S. LoNGBo rTOM for
respondent.
There was not such fraud as will furnigh
ground for a divorce. Allen's Appeal, 99
Pa. 199; Crehore v. Crehore, 97 Mass. 330;
Fos s v. Foss, 12 Allen 26; Bartholemew v.
Bartholemew, 3 Dist. R. 557; Hoffman v.
Hoffman, 30 Pa. 417; Todd v. Todd, 149 Pa.
60.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

By the first section of the Act of May
8, 1854, P. &. L. Dig. 1634, it is provided
that "it shall be lawful for the courts of
common pleas of this commonwealth to
grant divorce where the alleged marriage
was procured by fraud, force or coercion."
By this language must of course be understood snch fraud as would at common law
render a marriage void. It is settled beyond all controversy, that fraud which
would vitiate any other contract-even tin
executory contract to marry-will not have
that effect when the marriage has actually
been solemnized and consummated. It is
not to be supposed that every error or mistake into which a person may fall concerning the character or qualities of a wife or
husband, although occasioned by disingenuous or even false statements or practices, will afford sufficient reason for annulling an executed contract of marriage.
Representations, in respect to the qualities
of one of the contracting parties in his condition, rank, fortune, manners and character would be insufficient. The law
makes no provisions for the relief of blind
credulity however it may have been produced. The fraud, in order to warrant a
decree, must be in what has sometimes
been termed the essentialia of the contract.
Allen's Appeal, 99 Pa. 196. While it is
difficult to lay down ny rule which can
sharply define and distinguish what are
and what are not essentials, yet it is well
settled that want of chastity on the part
of the woman, ante-nuptial incontinence,
even though she may have expressly represented herself as virtuous, forms no
ground for avoiding the contract. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 30 Pa. 417; Allen's Ap-
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peal, supra; Foss v. Foss, 12 Allen 26. The
law in the exercise of a wise and sound
policy, seeks to render the contract of marriage when once executed, as far as possible
indissoluble. The great object of marriage
in a civilized and Christian community is
to secure the existence and permanence of
the family relation, and to insure the legitimacy of offspring. It would tend to
defeat this object if mere misrepresentation such as this case discloses was allowed
to be the basis of proceedings on which to
found a dissolution of the marriage tie.
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen 605. If allegations as to prior chastity.goes not to
the essence of the contract and does not
furnish a basis upon which to render a decree of dissolution, mere misrepresentations that a former husband is dead, when,
in fact he is alive and his separation from
his former wife is due to a divorcegranted
while they were residents of California,
falls short of the essence of the contract.
It advances not the morals or merits of
society, to treat lightly or loosely the obligation of the matrimonial contract; a
contract which, from its peculiar nature
and on grounds of public policy, the law
regards as especially sacred and inviolable.
It cannot be avoided or set aside on the
groundoffraud excepton the most plenary
and satisfactory proof of deceit and imposition touching matters which constitute
the essentials of the marriage relation.
Applying the general principles to the case
in hand, it is apparent that the libel does
not disclose a ground for divorce. It is
not necessary that the case should go to
the jury. Nonsuit awarded.
WILLIAM E. ELMES, J.
DEPOSIT BANK vs. DROVERS'
BANK'S ASSIGNEE.
Biqht of agent for collection of payee of
check to recover possession of checkfrom
drawee who has paid check by worthless
instrument.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Jacobs held a check on the Drovers
Bank, drawn by Win. Hope, which he
deposited with the Deposit Bank for collection. The bank placed it to his credit
in his account. The Deposit Bank sent

the check to the Drovers Bank which received it and gave the Deposit Bank a
check on the Merchants Bank, where it
had sufficient iunds, the amount of the
check equalling Jacobs' check and two
others which had been in the hands of the
Deposit Bank and presented to the Drovers
Bank.
The next morning the check was presented to the Merchants Bank which refused to pay it because three hours before
the Drovers Bank made an assignment for
the benefit of creditors. TheDeposit Bank
then demanded the retuirn of the checks of
the assignee, of the Drovers Bank who refused. The intention of the former Bank
was to ue the depositor upon the check,
Win. Hope.
W. S. CLARK and JOHN KEMP for
plaintiff.
When drawee fails to pay check, he is
not entitled to its possession. Possession
is presumptive evidence of payment. Callahan v. Bank. 78 Ky. 604; Porter v. Nelson, 121 Pa. 628; Bracken v. Miller, 4 W.
& S. 102; Conway v. Case, 22 Ill. 127.
The drawee did not "pay" here, for payr.
ment by a worthless check or note is no
payment. Holmes v. Bank, 126 Mass.
353; Martin v.Pennock, 2 Pa. 376; Graham's
Estate. 14 Phila. 280; Patton v. Ash, 7 S.
& R. 116.
If the drawer of a check has neither
funds nor credit in the bank on which it
is drawn, its acceptance by the creditor
does not constitute payment. Fleig v.
Sleet, 43 0. S. 53; Tobey v. Barber, 5 John's
(N. Y.) 68; Tanner v. Bank, 23 How. Pr.
Rsp. 399.
The plaintiff is entitled to the cheek, so
as to sue its depositor as endorser. Rapp
v. Bank, 136 Pa. 426; Peterson v. Bank, 52
206$; Ry. Co. v. Johnston, 133 U. S. 566.
The plaintiff is entitled to the check as
agent for its depositor. The depositor can
sue the drawer on the check. The drawer
is presumed to be solvent in such a case.
Bank v. Bank, 77 X. Y. 320; Ingalls v.
Lord, 1 Cowen 240.
W. A. VALENTINE and J. B.'KEPNEDY
for defendant.
The plaintiff cannot recover the checks
and thus secure a preference out of the asigned estate. The plaintiffs remedy is
on the check given by the defendant.
Venango Bank v.Taylor,56 Pa. 14; Trickett
on Assignments, p. 242. To permit a recovery would interfere with the distribution of the estate. Palm's Trust Estate, 3
Dist. 456; Fox's Appeal, 93 Pa. 417;
Trickett on Assigns, p. 17.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

This case has been sent up as a case
stated; after a careful inquiry into the:
facts we find them very unsatisfactory and
incomplete, and it indeed becomes well
nigh impossible to reach a legitimate conclusion, without making some presumptions which would hardly be warranted
were the case stated more clearly and
specifically.
The whole question seems to be, did the
Deposit Bank accept the check on the
Merchants Bank as payment for its own
checks, or did it simply accept the check
ag a voucher, for the purpose of going down
to the Merchants Bank and procuring the
money, so in case there were insufficient
funds there it could return and receive its
own checks again. In the absence of any
information on this point we must presume it to be an ordinary business transaction, and that the check on the Merchants Bank was received in payment for
the three checks in dispute. Surely such
would have been the case had the check
been presented on the day of making, for
on that day there were sufficient funds in
the Bank to meet it.
In the language of the court in 1st National Bank of Northumberland v. McMichael: Bank checks are regarded as constituting by far the largest part of the
practical currency of the business world,
and are of the greatest possible consequence
in commercial transactions. Regarding
this check then in thislight it followsthat
the natural supposition would be that it
was given in payment of the three checks
in dispute.
The check was good and worth its full
face value. The Deposit Bank did not see
fit to collect on that day but carried it over
to the next day. In the meantime the
check had depreciated in value through
this assignment. Shall we then say this
check was worthless and therefore no payment at all as the plaintiff alleges? This
we cannot do. The check is not worthless
as yet. The Deposit Bank's rights became
fined at the time of the assignment. The
property of the Drovers Bank passed Eo
Instanteinto the hands of the Assignee;
from that time on the Deposit Bank was
only an ordinary creditor of the assigned
estate, entitled to their pro rata share in

the distribution of the fund in the hands
of the auditor.
W. B. GERY, J.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The Deposit Bank sent the check, which
it had received from John Jacobs for collection, 'to the Drovers Bank on which it
was drawn. The latter bank gave the
former a check on the Merchants Bank
where it had sufficient funds. This check
was presented in due time, i. e. the next
morning, but the Drovers Bank had practically withdrawn the fund from the Merchants Bank by assigning it with its other
assets for the benefit of creditors, Zane
Banking, p. 576. It must have been insolventand been awareof its insolvency when
the check was delivered. Had the check
had value the Drovers Bank could have
been compelled to surrender it to the Deposit Bank, because the check which it
gave in exchange, it intended to make
worthless and in fact made worthless by
an assignment for the benefit of creditors
before the presentment of the check was
practicable. Com. Exchange Nat. Bank
v. Loan and Trust Co., 188 Pa. 330.
On the other hand, the check has no
value for the Drovers Bank. 'The bank
would have extinguished it by paying it
and would have had a right to retain it as
evidence of proper payment in the settlement with the drawer, whose money the
bank had on deposit. But not in fact paying this depositor's check, it could make no
proper useofit. The check therefore seems
to have had no value to the Drovers Bank
nor to its assignee.
But the want of interest in it, on the
part of the Drovers Bank, would not support this action of trespass. The Deposit
Bank must show that it has a right to the
possession and use of the check. A s it has
not been paid by the Drovers Bank, It is
evident that the drawer, Win. Hope, is
prima facie liable on it, either to John
Jacobs or to the Deposit Bank. He has
lost his deposit by the insolvency of the
bank, and if his check was not presented
in due time, and if it having been presented
in due time it would have been paid, the
loss would fall, not on him but the holder
of the cheok; National State Bank v. Well,
141 Pa. 457. So far as appears, no delay
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occurred in the presentment of the check.
Jacobs left it with the Deposit Bank for
collection; that bank sent it to the Drovers
Bank. These acts were done, perhaps, in
one day. The Deposit Bank might have
insisted on payment in cash, or could have
protested the cheek for non-payment. It
accepted instead a check on the Merchants
Bank, which it presented early the next
morning. Nothing shows that more than
twenty-four hours elapsed from the delivery of the check by Hope to Jacobs, and
the dishonorof the checkon the Mercbants
Bank. We are not prepared to say that
Hope has been discharged by the acceptance, as conditional payment of the check
on the Merchants Bank. There was no
default of expedition that would cast the
loss from Hope upon Jacobs or his endorsee.
Rosenthal v. Ehrlicher, 154 Pa. 396; Nat
State Bank v. Weil, 141 Pa. 457; Loux v
Fox, 171 Pa. 68.
Does the right of action belong to Jacobs
or to the Deposit Bank? The bank has
given Jacobs credit for the check in his
account. It has not attempted to revoke
that credit. Until it does so, it is the
owner of the check, and as respects Jacobs
has the right of action on it. Nor do we
think that it could revoke the credit if it
wished to do so. The entry of the credit
was, doubtless, intended to be provisional
and revocable. But, the Deposit Bank on
presenting the check to the Drovers Bank
chose instead of cash, to accept a check on
a third bank. The former bank must, as
respects Jacobs, be regarded as having received payment. Merchants National
Bank v. Goodman, 109 Pa. 422; Fifth National Bank v. Ashworth, 123 Pa. 212;
Pepperday v. National Bank, 183 Pa. 519;
Hazlett v. Commercial National Bank, 132
Pa. 118. It took the risk on itself of its
ability to collect the check.
It follows that Hope has not been- discharged from his liability as drawer upon
the check by any facts heretofore considered and that the plaintiff is the owner of
the right of action against him. It does
not appear that the check was protestedprotest is usual but unnecessary-nor that
notice of its non-payment was duly given
to Hope. As this is an action, not against
Hope upon the check, but against the assignee of the Drovers Bank by the Deposit

Bank, we think it unnecessary in order to
sustain it, to show that the procedure presented by the law merchant has been pursued. The defendant has no right to the
check nor is it of any value to him. The
plaintiff has aprimafacie right to it. He
is entitled at least to nominal damages.
Judgment reversed.
JAMES CRAWFORD vs. WILLIAM
WEAVER.
Proceedings to vacate premises, under Act
of 1863, before, J. P.-No.jurisdiction
where length of term is uncertain and
indefinite.

C. A. PIPER and SAM'L E. BASEHORE
for plaintiff.
The tenant cannot deny the landlord's
title. Miller v. McBrier, 14 S. & R. 382.
The proceedings are properly brought
under the Act of Dec. 14, 1863.
W. L. SHIPMAN and DAN. KLINE for
defendant.
Where the termination of the tenancy
depends upon a contingency and is uncertain, the landlord and tenant Act does not
apply. Steel v. Thompson, 3 P. & W. 34.
A lease for a term certain and thereafter
to continue at the will of the lessee is a perpetual lease. Effinger v. Lewis, 32 Pa. 367;
Myers v. Coal Co.. 126 Pa. 601; Lewis v.
Effinger, 30 Pa. 281.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This is an appeal from the decision of a
Justice, who entered judgment for the
plaintiff.
The first question to be considered is
whether the agreement between the parties
could operate as a lease. While the question is not free from doubt, we gre however
of the opinion that the agreement is not
void on account of uncertainty of the term.
The defendant was to remain on the
premises until he could sell his bakery.
In Clark v. Rhoads, 79 Ind. 842, a lease to
operate until the lessor should sell the land
was held sufficiently certain to define a
term, and in Kengel v. Painter, 166 Pa.
592, an agreement that the occupant of
property was to continue in possession so
long as the same shall be used for R. R.
purposes was held to be sufficiently definite
in its nature to satisfy the requirements of
a good lease.
The second contention of plaintiff's
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party of the second part, can sell his bakery property on Central street, Edwardsville, Pa. Party of the second part (Wi.
Weaver) is to pay ten dollars per month
rent, including October, 1900, and if he
remains after October 30th, 1900, he is to
pay a rent of twelve dollars per month as
long as he shall occupy the premises."
This was signed by Jarims Crawford and
William Weaver, and sealed with their
respective seals.
Weaver continued in possession of the
residence, paying rent at $10 per month
to Nov. 4th, 1900, and at $12 per month
from Nov. 4th, 1900, to April 4th, 1901.
The house, it seems, was worth from S15
to $1i a month. On Dec. 6th, 1900, Crawford served written notice on Weaver to
vacate the premises "at the end of your
current term, to-wit, April 1st. 1901.."
Disregarding this notice, Weaver not
having, so far as appears, sold the bakery,
or been able to sell it, continued in possession of the residence beyond April lst,
1901, whereupon Crawford began proceedings before a justice of the peace, und,,r
the"Act of Dec. 14th, 1863, for the recovery
of possession. The justice having entert.d
a judgment for Crawford, Weaver appealdc
to the common pleas and that court l:,s
reversed the judgment.
The Act of Dec. 14th, 1863, confers its
remedy upon the landlord when there h.as
been a lease or demise to any person "for a
term of one or more years, or at will."
The Act of March 6th, 1872, 1 P. & L.
2654, declares it shall not be lawful to pursue the remedy of the Act of 1863, unless
there is "a written lease or contract in
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
renting," or "a parol agreement," "in and
and
bakery
William Weaver, owning a
by which the relation of landlord and
a residence in Edwardsville, received an
tenant is established between the parties,
application from Crawford for the purand a certain rent is therein reserved."
chase of the residence. Weaver agreed to
Under the earlier act, the lease must have
sell it for $3,300. The deed was executed
been for a year, or for years, or at will.
and delivered on June 4th, 1900. On the
The later requires simply that it shall
same day, but before the delivery of the
create the relation of landlord and tenant
deed, this agreement was written and exeand stipulate for a certain rent. We think
cuted: "This agreement made this4th day
the agreement between Crawford and
of June, 1900, between James Crawford of
Weaver establishes the relation of landthe first part and Win. Weaver of the
and tenant. The rent reserved iscerlord
second part, witnesseth that the party of
The agreement is a "lease or coiitain.
the first part agrees to leave the party of
tract."
the second part remain on the premises
The lease, however, is until 'Weavcr
which I have this day purchased from the
"can sell his bakery." If this is equivaparty of the second part until he, the said

counsel, that the lessor cobld not make a
valid lease before the deed was delivered
is more meritorious. The testimony shows
that the agreement purporting to be a
lease was executed before the delivery of
the deed. We are of the opinion that a
valid lease cannot be made under such circumstances. Hall v. Benner, 1 P. & W.
407. We therefore hold that the lease is
not valid.
The next question to be considered is
whether the Landlord and Tenant act of
1863 applies to this case. While counsel
have not referred us to any cases construing this act, yet portions of it are so simnilar to parts of the Landlord and Tenant
act of 1772 that the cases decided under
the latter act aid us materially in reaching
a conclusion as to the applicability of the
act of 1863. Having already decided that
the agreement is nota valid lease, it seems
clear that there has been no such letting
as is conteml)lated by the act. In Steele
v. Thompson, 3 P. & W. 34, it was held
that the Landlord and Tenant act only
applies to the plain and ordinary case of a
demise at a certain fixed rental.
Moreover the plaintiff must show to the
justice that he had demised the premises
for a term fully ended.
As the defendant had not sold his bakery it is apparent that even if the agreement be regarded as a valid lease the
plaintiff has not shown the facts necessary
to give the justice jurisdiction. Steele v.
Thompson, supra. Judgment must therefore be entered for the defendant.
WILL W. JOHNSTON, J.
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lent to until Weaver does sell his bakery,
the lease is practically one for as long as
Weaver may choose. Such a lease would
be valid, Effinger v. Lewis, 32 Pa. 367;
Lewis v. Effingeik, 30 Pa. 281; Mlyers v.
Kingston Coal Co., 126 Pa. 582. It is
probable, however, that the partics contemplated that the sale should be made
within a comparatively short time.
Weaver was under a duty reasonably to
endeavor to find a purchaser, and to offer
to sell on reasonable terms and at a reasonable price. A just interpretation of the
contract will make it mean that he is to
occupy the premises no longer than may
be necessary in order to effect the sale.
He may, however, occupy them so long.
This being the sense of the contract, we
think there are two objections to the proceedings before the justice.
1. There is no evidence that on April
1st, 1901, the time of the permissible occupancy of Weaver had expired. What efforts lie had made to find a purchaser , if
any; whether he had advertised; what
the price demanded was, remains wholly
undisclosed. That no sale has been made
is clear. That any sale could have been
made does not appear. The time, then,
for his vacation of the premises does not
seem to have arrived on April 1st, 1901.
2. It was not the intention of the Act
of 1863, and its supplements, to confer
jurisdiction on a justice to oust a tenant
wheu his right to remain depended on
facts requiring careful and exact scrutiny.
The Act requires a "certain rent" to have
been reserved. This, says Sterrett J., excludes cases "where the rent reserved is
so uncertain as to require the intervention
of a jury to render it certain." Davis v.
'Davis, 115, 261. It could not have been
intended to confide in a single justice the
right to expel a tenant from the possession
of the leasehold on his judgment as to
whether the possibility of making a sale
of a house had occurred.
We seriously
question whether the justice may eject a
tenant in any case in which the lease is
not for a term of years, at will, from year
to year, or until the happening of an objective and easily discernible event.
Crawford notified Weaver to vacate the
premises at the end of his current term,
to-wit, April 1st, 1901. We are at a loss to

understand

the theory on which this

notice was given. The evidence of Crawford and wife before the justice was, that
Weaver, after the delivery of the deed,
orally.agreed to "remain in the house for
three months from June 4th, at $11 per
nmonth and one month after at $12." In
Ihat view, the term would have expired
Oct. 4th, 1900.
If the theory to be adopted were, that
Weaver was a tenant from miouth to
month, the notice to him on Dec. 6th,
1900, to vacate the house on the following
April 1st would scarcely be explicable.
April 1st was not the end of "your current
term," nor could it be made such by the
notice. The months would expire on the
4th day of each calendar month.
The Act of 1863 requires that 3 months'
notice of the landlord's intention to have
again and repossess the demised premises, should be given to the tenant. As
this notice must be given three months at
least before the end of the term, it is evident that a term is intended whose end
can be foreseen for three months. We
have already intimated that we do not
think a lease running until all event occurs, not in the power of the landlord and
not previsable, is such as the statute contemplates. The notice of Dec. 6,1900, does
not indicate a time for the vacation of the
premises, when it was the duty of Weaver
to vacate them. Although, had Weaver
been under .duty to retire on April 1st,
1901, the notice more than three months
before that day would have been valid,
(Snyder v. Carfrey, 54 Pa. 90) there is
nothing that justifies us in saying that
Weaver was on that day under any duty
to remove.
The judgment of the learned Court of
Common Pleas, reversing the judgment
of the justice, is affirmed.
COM. OF PENNSYLVANIA TO USE
OF EDITH EDWARDS vs. GEORGE
MARTINET AL.

Liability of notarypublic who makesfalse
certificate as to acknowledgment of deed
-Present aw as to separate acknowledgment of marriedwoman.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Fred. Edwards, a married man, contracted to sell his homestead to John Ber-
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win for $20,000, and the deed was duly
signed, sealed and acknowledged- by Edwards. His wife, Edith Edwards, through
fear of bodily harm, alsosigned and sealed
the deed, and then, for thepurpose of having her acknowledgment taken, was subsequently called on by Martin, a notary
public, who was in the same office as her
husband. The wife, being examined separate and -apart from her husband, acknowledged the signature to be hers, but
told the notary, Martin, that she signed
the deed unwillingly. lie stated to her,
"In that case it is an ilh.gal deed." She
replied, "I am glad of that, as it will enable me to fight it hereaft,,r."
The notary departed, and subsequently
duly certified in the usual form for a married woman that Edith Fdwards had acknowledged the deed, making no mention
whatever of her objections. The deed was
thereupon delivered to Berwin, who paid
the consideration, and entered into possession. Berwin had no knowledge of the
position of Edith Edwards, who took no
steps to have the deed set aside during her
husband's life through fear. Fred. Edwards died five years after the delivery of
the deed, leaving no issue, but leaving to
survive him his wife, Edith. The property has meanwhile doubled in value.
Edith Edwards now brings this action
against George Martin, notary public, and
his sureties, Win. McArthur and Edwin
Thompson, on his official bond, for damages sustained by her.
F. J. HELRIEGEL and S. KAUFFMAN for
plaintiff.
As against an innocent purchaser, the
certificate of acknowledgment is conclusive as to the facts therein set forth. Williams v. Baker, 71 Pa. 477; Louden v.
Blythe, 16 Pa. 532; Hall v. Patterson, 51
Pa. 290.
The notary is liable on his bond for making a false certificate. Act 5 March, 1791,
2 P. & L. 3240; Act 28 March, 1803, 2 P. &
L. 4307; 16 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law,
779; Vanderwater v. Williamson, 13 Phila.
142; Overacre v. Blake, 82 Cal. 77; Stevenson v. Brasher, 90 Ky. 23; Cameron v.
Calkins, 44 Mich. 51.
R. H. LAMBERT and A. M. HOAGLAmD
for defendant.
Since Act of 1893 a separate acknowledgment is not necessary. Reed's Estate,
3 Dist. 503. The certificate of a notary as
to an acknowledgment is a judicial act,
and he is liable only in cases where he acts
fraudulently. Com. v. Haines, 97 Pa.

228; Oppeheimer v. Wright, 106 Pa. 569;
Assoc. v. Sowers, 134 Pa. 354; Assoc. v.
Heiser, 150 Pa. 514.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The duties, oblivations and powers of a
notary in Pennsylvania are well defined
by the statutes-2 P. & L. 3237, and among
them is the power "to take and receive
the separate examination of anyfemme
covert touching or concerning her right of
dower, or the conveyance of her estate or
right in or to any such lands, tenements
or hereditaments." 2 P. & L. 3243. This
mode of acknowledgment is her only safeguard against being deprived of her property without her consent, or by the threats
or ill-treatment of a cruel husband. For,
as between herself and an innocent, purchaser, the certificate of the notary is conclusive evidence of the acknowledgment.
71 Pa. 477; 16 Pa. 532; 51 Pa. 289. Hence,
it necessarily arises, that to make a valid
acknowledgment it must be shown that
she made it with her own free will, that
no fraud or duress was practiced upon her,
and that she had a full knowledge of the
paper's contents. 27 Pa. 22; 9 Pa. 14.
For breach of his official duty a notary
may be "sued by any party or parties injured, and with the like effect as bonds
given by sheriffs and coroners for the faithful execution of their respective offices."
2 P. & L. 3240. Also, in 2 P. & L. 4307,
we find that "where the Commonwealth
or any individual shall be aggrieved by
the misconduct of any sheriff or coroner,
it shall be lawful to institute actions of
debt against such sheriff or coroner and
their sureties upon such obligations."
Hence, it appears that a notary is liable
upon his official bond for a breach of his
official duty. 13 Phila. 142.
In the case at bar Martin made the acknowledgment without Mrs. Edwards'
consent, and in the face of statements
made by her that ought to put an ordinarily prudent notary on his guard, and
which would stop him from acknowledging until he was sure that Mrs. Edwards
was acting according to the dictates of her
own free will.
We think that Martin is guilty of a
breach of his official duty, and he therefore is liable on his official bond.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
ROBERT H. MooN, J.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
This is an action upon the official bond
of George Martin, a notary public. The
use-plaintiff alleges that she has suffered
damage on account of a false certificate
upon a deed for land of her husband,
signed and sealed by him and her, whereby the notary certified that being examined separate and apart from her husband,
she acknowledged that she executed it
freely and without coercion or compulsion
of her husband.
The husband has died, and Mrs. Edith
Edwards would now be entitled to dower
in one-half of the land had the conveyance
not been made. She apparently claims,
as damages, the value of this dower.
The defendant contends that, since the
Act of June 8, 1893, P. L. 344, a separate
acknowledgment is unnecessary, and,
therefore, that no harm has been wrought
by the certificate, even if false. In an
able opinion Judge Stewart, in Reed's Estate, 3 D. R. 503, reached the conclusion
that a separate acknowledgment by a married woman of a deed is no longer required.
In Bingler v. Bowman, 194 Pa. 10, however, a contrary result was reached by
Justice Mitchell, who holds that since the
Act of 1893, as well as before, the conveyance by a married woman must be both
joined in by the husband, and acknowledged separate and apart from him. Cf.
Whitlinger v. Jack, 16 Pa. C. C. 112. This
is true, when the conveyance is of her own
property. Itis assumed thatit is afortiori
true, when the conveyance is in substance
a release of her dower in her husband's
lands. 194 Pa. 210; Kaiser's Estate, 14
Superior 155. It may be here remarked that
the Act of April 4, 1901, declaring that
acknowledgments by a married woman of
any deeds shall be taken "in the same
manner and form as though said married
woman werefemme sole," and shall, when
so taken, "have the same force and effect
as if taken separate and apart from the
husband of said married woman," seems
to render separate acknowledgments superfluous; but does not dispense with some
acknowledgment.
The acknowledgment made by Mrs. Edwards was therefore necessary to the
validity of her release of her dower. The
certificate of it was as to a grantee, or one

obtaining ownership from the grantee in
ignorance of its falsity, conclusive against
her of all matters averred in it, concerning
the voluntariness of her execution of the
deed. Heilman v. Kroh, 155 Pa. 1; Trust
Co. v. Kline, 192 Pa. 1. It follows that
M rs. Edwards cannot now effectually assert a. right to dower in he' late husband's
land. Can she then look for indemnity to
the notary ?
The notary, in receiving acknowledgments, exercises a judicial office, and partakes to a degree in the exemption from
liability, which judicial officers enjoy in
respect to errors committed by them. If,
e. g., he mistakeg one who personates X,
for X, and certifies to the acknowledgment
by X of a deed purporting to be his, when
in fact the acknowledgment is made by
the personator, he will not be liable if he
exercised good faith; if he was not guilty
of a "clear and intentional dereliction of
duty." Com. v. Haines, 97 Pa.228. But,
if he is guilty of such dereliction, he ought
to be, and will be, responsible for the consequences of it.
Mrs. Edwards told the notary that she
had signed the deed unwillingly. He understood her, and he understood the legal
effect of what she said, for he replied, "In
that case, it is an illegal deed." Her reply left him under no illusion as to her
intention to dispute the validity of the
deed. She had no reason to think that
the notary, after his remark to her, would
falsely certify the deed. Shehad done all
she was called on to do, if she intended
not to be bound by it. When, then, Martin certified that Mrs. Edwards had acknowledged the deed to be freely executed
by her, he was conscious that he was certifying to a falsehood; and he knew that
by such certificate he was depriving Mrs.
Edwards of power successfully to claim
dower in her husband's land. For the
effects of this act he ought to be, he is,
liable to indemnify her. The law had set
him between her husband and herself, to
prevent spoliation by the former of her interests in his land. Instead of doing his
duty in this regard, he has betrayed her.
As no point has been made concerning
the measure of damages, we refrain from
discussing this question.
Judgment affirmed.
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HIRSH ET AL vs. LLOYD.
Rights of adjoining owners in non-navigable lake.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Abraham Lloyd is the owner of a large
tract of land, a portion of which is covered
by a body of water known as Lily Lake.
The lake is fed by subterranean springs
and by a small stream that flows from an
adjoining mountain. On the western side
of the lake there is an outlet and the water
that flows through this outlet forms a small
stream that flows down the mountain and
empties into the Susquehanna River. A
small portion of the lake, on the northeastern corner, covers the plaintiffs' lands.
Before plaintiffs purchased theland, Lloyd
erected on the shores of the lake a large
hotel, several cottages and at a considerable expense improved the ground surrounding the buildings. As a result of
the improvements the lake became popular as a summer resort. After the lake attained its popularity the plaintiffs purchased from al adjoining property owner
the land on the northeastern corner. They
also erected cottages, improved the ground
surrounding them and sailed their boats
and launches on the portion of the lake
that covered Lloyd's land. Lloyd notified
them to discontinue but they refused. He
then erected on the line dividing the
water on his land from that on the plaintiffs' land a boom, thus preventing the
plaintiffs from sailing their boats on the
main portion of the lake. A preliminary
injunction was granted restraining Lloyd
from maintaining the boom. The court
then granted a rule to show cause why the
injunction should not be made perpetual.
J. 0. ADAmSON and W. S. DETRicc for
plaintiff.
The lake is a natural body of water and
the adjacentowners have title to low waler
mark only. Tie right to travel upon the
lake is open to the public. Waterman v.
Johnson, 13 Pick. 301; Prim v. Wallace, 38
Mo. 99; Filmer v. Williams, 122 Pa. 191;
West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 7 Allen 167;
Canal Conunrs. v. People, 5 Wend. 446.
R. J. BORYER and M. B. STERRETT for
defendant.
The lake being non-navigable, the adjacent ownership extends to the soil be.
neath the lake. 140 U. S. 341; 32 N. J. L.
369; 134 N. Y. 355; 34 Conn. 462.

The defendant has the right to reserve
the privileges of boating and fishing upon
the lake. Mlitchell's Pa.Real Estate, p. 21..
OPINION OF THE COURT.

There seems to be no dispute as to the
ownership of the land which surrounds
and is covered by the waters of Lily Lake.
The absolute title is in the plaintiffs and
defendant and the land of each is described
by metes and bounds.
The question of primary significance is
whether the lake is public or private. If
this is a public stream then the plaintiffs
are entitled to a perpetual injunction to restrain the defendant from maintaining
liis boom.
At the common law those streams only
are considered navigable in which the tide
ebbs and flows; this is also the doctrine in
several of the United States. In Pen nsylvania navigability in fact, not the ebb and
flow of the tide, is made the test by which
the character of a stream as public or private is determined, and the great but tideless rivers of the state are therefore held to
be lublic highways, belonging to the state
and held for the use of all her citizens.
Stover v. Jack, 60 Pa. 339; Fulmer v. Williams, 122 Pa. 191.
A navigable stream is one which affords
a passage to vessels. Lily Lake is fed by
subterranean springs and by a small stream
and its only outlet forms a small brook
that flows down the mountain side. It is
a fact that only row boats were used on
the Lake and it cannot be said that it was
navigable in the common senseof the term.
A lake which is not really useful for navigation, although of considerable size compared with ordinary fresh water streams,
may be private property. Lembeck v.
Nye, 47 Ohio St. 336. The bed of the lake
being private property the public has no
right to fish in and boat upon its waters.
Lembeck v. Nye, supra; Haupt's Appeal,
125 Pa. 224. As soon as the plaintiffs sail
their boats upon that part of the lake the
lied of which belongs to the defendant,
they become trespassers and are liable in
damages; not because the latter has any
ownership in the water which covers his
laud but because the former have no right
of access to it.
It is a principle of the common law that
there can be no ownership in the flowing
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water of a stream. Mayor v. Commissioners, 7 Pa. 363; Haupt's Appeal, supra;
Penna. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 112 Pa. 34; 2
B1. Con. 14. But an upper riparian owner
has the right to use the water for household purposes and for watering stock, and
also for manufacturing and other purposes,
to an extent that is not unreasonable bearing in mind the size of the stream.
Wheatley v. Chrisman, 24 Pa. 298; Irving
v. Borough of Media, 194 Pa. 648; Penna.
R. R. Co. v. Miller, suora. Where there
is a defined stream, whether over or below
the surface, the upper owner has no right
unreasonably to divert the water to the
injury ofalower owner. Brown v.Kistle ,
190 Pa. 499. On thisaccount the plaintiffs
cannot complain for it has not been shown
that the defendant by erecting his boom
has diverted the -water from its usual
course. For the above reasons the rule
must be discharged.
SAM'L E. BASEHORE, J.
JAMES THORNE vs. LUMBERMEN'S

BANK.
Ba ks-Checks-Sub-agents.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Thorne was payee on a draft for $2,000,
drawn by Amos Shoop upon Charles
Nailer, at 90 days. Nailer lived in Pittsburg, Thorne deposited the draft with the
defendant, a bank in Potter county, for
collection. The bank sent it to a bank in
Pittsburg which presented it for payment
and took Nailer's check for the amount,
drawn on a bank in Williamsport, payable
to the Lumbermen's Bank. The Lumbermen's Bank, intormed of this, entered a
credit for S2,000 to the deposit of Thorne.
Two days afterwards the defendant was
informed that the check was rejected by
the Williamsport Bank for want of funds
of the drawer, and the defendant debited
Thorne's account with the $2,000. Its
right to do this is disputed by Thorne who
brings assumpsit for the $2,000.
ALEXANDER and MITCHELL for plaintiff.
Collecting bank has no right, unless authorized to do so, to accept anything in
lieu of money in collection for draft from
purchaser or sub-agent employed. Bank
v. Goodman, 109 Pa. 422; Bank v. Ash-

worth, 123 Pa. 212; Hazlett v. Bank, 132
Pa. 118.
Defendant bank had no right to charge
back the credit, and it could not relieve
itself from doing so, from liability for
amount thereof, to the depositor. Pepperday v. Bank, 183 Pa. 519.
GRAUL and HOLCOIMB for defendant.
Where amount of check left with bank
for collection is credited as cash, it may be
charged back in case check turns out to be
worthless. Raf v. Bank, 136 Pa. 426;
Hazlitt v. Bank, 132 Pa. 118; Holmes v.
Briggs, 131 Pa. 233.
Collecting bank is liable only when
negligent in appointing sub-agent.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Notwithstanding the cases which the
defendant's counsel has cited to substantiate their statement a collecting bank is
liable only when negligent in selecting a
sub-agent for collection, we cannot see
that the Supreme Court of this State has
ever squarely ruled as they contend. In
every case which they have cited there
were other circumstances than a mere
agency to collect on which the decision is
based, or the agency was to transmit for
collection.
But granting their contention, we do
not think it is a good defense in this case.
If the Lumbermen's Bank had not accepted the check payable to itself the contention would prevail, but as it-has chosen
to accept such a check it must suffer the
consequences. The Pittsburg Bank had
no right to take anything but money in
payment of the draft. National Bank v.
Goodman, 109 Pa. 422; Bank v. Ashworth,
123 Pa. 212; Hazlett v. Bank, 132 Pa. 118.
By accepting the check it committed a
wrong. The Lumbermen's Bank in turn
accepted the check from the Pittsburg
Bank, co-operated in the wrong and is
liable therefor.
The defendant also contends that where
a check is left at a bank for collection and
the owner of the check is given credit for
the amount thereof on his deposit account,
such amount may be charged back if the
check turns out to be worthless. The priuciple is correct but it is not applicable to the
case at bar. It applies only where the
owner of a check has deposited it with the
bank for collection. In the case at bar
the plaintiff was not the holder of the
check in question and he did not deposit
it for collection. The check was drawn
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payable to the defendant and was therefore his property. He might do with it as
he chose. Only by indorsement could it
have become the plaintiff's. It was
never thus indorsed. The defendant assunied the check itself and thereby assumed its collection. In Pepperday v.
National Bank, 183 Pa. 519, a case closely
analogous to the case at bar, Justice Green
said, "We know of no principle upon
which it can charge back to him a check
which he never saw, never owned, never
had any interest in and upon which his
name never did and does not now appear,
either as drawer, payee, indorser or in any
other manner."
Judgment for the plaintiff.
W. T. STAUFFER, J.

work was in the hands of Smith, who is

GERBER and BROCK for defendant.
Owner of premises is not liable for injuries caused by independent contractor.
Berg v. Parsons. 156 N. Y. 109; Raemer v.
Shriker, 142 N. Y. 134.
Plaintiff has not shown that due care
was not used. Borth v. Rome, 140 N. Y.
267.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

conceded by both parties to be an independent contractor. The contract was to
erect a building for the defendant, and it
contemplated that blasting would be necessary, and the place where it was done
was within three or four feet of the line of
separation between the two properties,
and about eight or nine feet from the plaintiff's house.
The defendants wi-h to excuse their liability to the plaintiff on the ground that
the work was in the handsof an indelendcut contractor. They succeeded in persuading us at the trial that such is the
law. But we believe that we erred in so
deciding, because we think that in many
like cases such laws would work injust ice
to land-owners.
It certainly is not the ]aw of Pennsylvania that one party can erect a house,
though on his own premises, but so near
to the property of another, where blasting
is absolutely necessary, and although all
due care is used, the property of an adjoining land-owner is entirely destroyed,
without compensating the owner of the
destroyed property. Thedefendantswould
tell us that such is the case for the lurpose of improvement of property. If this
were true, would not land-owners be deterred from building if their houses could
be destroyed by other land-owners with
impunity ? Then we think that in this
case the question of negligence is not to
be considered, since the direct act, and not
t collateral act of the contract, was the act
complained of. Since the defendant would
be liable if he did the work with his own
hands, he certainly cannot excuse himself
by placing the work in the hands of all
independent contractor, although of good
i eputation as such. and then tell the plaintiff to look to the contractor, who may be
insolvent or out of reach, for compensation. We think that aperson cannot himself or allow another to do a direct act
which will necessarily damage the property of another, although all due care is
used, without compensating the injured
party.

This is al action in trespass to recover
damages for an injury to the plaintiffI's
property by the blasting of rocks upon
adjoining laud of the defendant. The

We think that 111 Pa. 316, Edniundson
v. Railroad Co., does not apply in this
case, because the act complained of was
not an act required by the contract.

ADAM CROSSMAN vs. JOHN STORM.
Blasng "--" Indcpendent contractor."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Action in trespass to recover damages
for an injury to plaintiff's property by the
blasting of rocks upon adjoining land of
the defendant. The work was in the
hands of Smith, who had the contract to
erect a building for the defendant. The
contract contemplated that blasting would
be nece sary, and the place where it was
done was within three or four feet of the
line between plaintiff and defendant, and
about eight or nine feet from plaintiff's
house. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff moves for new trial.
CONRY" and WELSi for plaintiff.
The blasting to danger of neighborhood
was a nuisance. 127 Mass. 481; 2 N. Y.
159; 3 Gray 349.
Principal isliable for damage. 156 Mass.
474; 149 Mass. 340; 63 Conn. 49.5; 22 W. N.

C. 3 .
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In Mahony Township v. Scholly, 84 Pa.
136, the court said, whether the building
was constructed by the defendant or by
the contractor, the defendant is liable, as
it would be poorgrace to send tile plaintiff
to some contractor, who may be insolvent,
for his compensation.
The courts of different States have held
that where the act complained of was an
act required to be done by the terms of the
contract, the act itself being dangerous,
the defendant cannot shift his liability.
Tiffin v. McCormack, 34 Ohio 368; 63
Conn. 455; 156 Mass. 474; J27 Mass. 403;
149 Mass. 340; Wetherbee v. Partridge, 175
Mass. 185. We think, under the consideration of these cases and of justice between man and man, the verdict must be
set aside and a new trial granted.
FRANK RHODES, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Storm made a contract with Smith for
the erection, by the latter, upon the land
of the former, of a house. The contract
contemplated the necessity of blasting.
On the adjacent lot stood the house of
Crossinan. Smith, in the prosecution of
the work, blasted rocks at a point within
four feet of the boundary line, and within
nine feet of Crossmau's house. The house
was in some way, and to some degree, injured. How, or how much, does not appear.
It does not appear whether Smith was
negligent or unskillful, unless we are coinpelled to infer want of care or skill from
the fact that injury followed the blasting.
We know no reason for making such an
inference from such a premise. Possibly
there would be a liability on the part of
Smith, independently of skill or care. It
might be that, as one who keeps a lion or
tiger, or a reservoir of water, or a fire,
on his premises, is, according to some
opinions, bound to prevent their escape
-Cooley, Torts, 397, 410; Fletcher v. Ryland, 1 Exch. 265; 3 H. L. Cases 330; or
one who has a cesspool on his land must,
at his peril, prevent its contents invading
his neighbor's land-Cooley, Torts, 673;
so one who, for whatever legitimate purpose, explodes rocks on his land, must, at
his peril, prevent their fragments from
doing mischief on his neighbor's land.

We do not feel called upon now to decide
this question.
The ground of defense in the court below was, that the man who exploded the
rocks, and caused damage to Crossman's
house, either by the vibrations or the impact of the pieces of rock, was not Storm,
but Smith. It does not appear that the
blasting could not have been done without
the consequence, nor that the particular
mode of blasting adopted by Smith was
dictated by Storm. Smith "had the contract to erect a building for the defendant." The blasting was done by him iii
the process of the performanceof this contract. The sole quesion then is, whether
we are to impute Smith's act to Storm.
It is not the doctrine of the law, that
generally the sin of one man is to be imputed to another. Every man must bear
his own burden. The relations are few in
which the act of one is treated, for the
purpose of adjudging liability, as the act
of another. Some acts of a child, or of a
wife, have been attributed to parent or
husband. Acts of a servant are imputed
to the master. In a broad sense, Smith
was the servant of Storm. He did what
he did for Storm; under an impulse emnanating from Storm, for a compensation to
be paid by Storm. But the principle is
fairly well established, that an "independent contractor," though acting for his
co-contractor, is not to be esteemed his
servant, nor are his acts determined by his
own discretion, to be causally referred to
such co-contractor. Allen v. Willard, 57
Pa. 300; Edrhundson v. P. W. & Y. R. R.
Co., Ill Pa. 316; Gunther v. Yorkville
Borough, 3 Superior 403; Painter v. Piltts
burg, 46 Pa. 213; Hookey v. Oakdale Borough, 5 Superior 404; Eby v. Lebanon
County, 166 Pa. 632. In Berberich v.
Beach, 131 Pa. 165, a wall was built on A's
land, which fell, and in so doing crushed
in the house on B's land. The building
had been done, not by A, but by a contractor. A's immunity from liability was
affirmed. A caused the wall to be built,
but it might have been so built as not to
have fallen down. B was deemed the ultimate cause of the fall. Storm, let us suppose, caused the blasting to be done; but,
so far asappears, blasting might have been
effectually done without damaging the
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neighboring house. We are not able to
find that Storm dictated or contracted for
the particular blasting that was done, .or
for any blasting that would necessarily or
probably be followed by the harm to Crossman.
We think that the court at the trial
properly refused to allow the jury, upon
the evidence, to find a verdict against the
defendant, but that in setting aside the
verdict, directing a new trial, and, at the
new trial, suffering a verdict to be received
against the defendant, and in entering a
judgment thereon, grave error was committed.
Judgment reversed.

owner of a lot, built on one part of it, and
then conveyed the other part to Fisher,
making the middle line of the wall of the
building which he had erected the dividing line between the two lots, calling it a
party wall in the description and stipulation in the deed that the grantee, his heirs
or assigns, should not make use of the wall
for building a stipulated price therefore to
Voight, the plaintiff. He then conveyed
the lot with the building on to Wallace,
who subsequently purchased the lot, from
Fisher, and used the party wall.
The act of 1849 provides, "In all conveyances of houses and buildings the right to
and compensation for the party wall built
thereunto shall be taken to have passed to
the purchaser unless otherwise expressed."
GEO. DENSMORE vs. WM. KINGDON
Since the passage of this act the right of
Party Valls-Act 4pril 10, 1849-Covethe first builder to a party wall is considnants.
ered an interest in the realty which passes
to the grantee of the land, 30 Pa. 372.
STATEIENT OF THE CASE.
Therefore, the right of Densmore to paymnent when it should be used passed by
Plaintiff owned two adjoinhig lots. He
built on lot "A" and conveyed it to one subsequent conveyances to Kingdon, and
became vested in him.
Gray. Lot "B" he conveyed unimproved
The wall was built wholly on the land
to one Bartlett, the deed providing that
the grantee in accepting it agreed for him- of Densmore, but the effect of the conveyself, his heirs and assigns, to pay plaintiff ance from Densmore to Bartlet was to
one hundred dollars ($100) for so much of make the wall a party wall by agreement.
party wall standing on land as he might
The act of 1849 applies to a party wallwhether made such by statute prescription
use. Defendant subsequently bought both
lots and used the party wall. Action on
or agreement.
The counsel for plaintiff in this case conthe covenant.
tend, that the statute of 1849J was passed
HELRIEGEL for plaintiff.
Right to reimbursement-for use of party
for the benefit of cities of the first class.
wall is personal to first builder. Todd v.
Under the statute governing party walls
Stokes, 10 Pa. 155; Davis v. Harris, 9 Pa.
in Pittsburg the statute of 1849 is not men501.
Acceptance of deed and enjoyment of tioned. It is cited under the laws governing party walls in Philadelphia.
the estate estops defendant from denying
We
covenant. Dock Co. v. Learit, 54 N. Y.
think if this statute is applicable in Alle35; Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y.
gheny county itis applicable to the case in
440.
hand.
PEIGHTEL and LAMBERT for defendant.
In 1 Pennypacker 463, Euer v. HenderRight of payment for use of wall passed
son, thc court said, "Weare of the opinion
to Gray and his assigns and plaintiff's
right is ended. Voight v. Wallace, 179
that since (he act 1849, if not always before,
Pa. 520.
outside of Philadelphia, the first builder's
Right to party wall passes to grantee of
interest in a party wall is in law what it
land. Knight v. Bunker, 30 Pa. 372; Act
April 10, 1849.
always was in fact, an interest, in the
realty, and not a mere personal right."
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Though the btatute in regard to party in
We think this case is governed by Voight
the city of Philadelphia are not in force in
v. Wallace, 179 Pa. 520, which seems to be
the city of New Castle, yet the principles
a parallel case.
thereby adopted entitled to weight in deThe facts of that case are: Voight, the
termining the question.
The decisions
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seem to be in favor of applying the statute
of 1849 to the commonwealth. We think
the plaintiff iu this case is not entitled to
recover.
Judgment for defendant.
DETRICK, J.
OPINION OF TE SUPREME COURT.
Densmore has conveyed the lot on
which the building stands, the use of
whose party wall is in question, toGray,
and the adjacent lot to Bartlett. Bartlett's
deed contains a covenant for himself,
Bartlett, his heirs and assigns, to pay $100
to Densniore for the use of the party wall.
It is to be noticed that Densmore, at the
time of the conveyance to Bartlett, had
ceased to be the owner of the wall. It
had passed to Gray. We do not doubt
that this covenant between Densmore and
Bartlett imposed on the latter the contingent duty of paying the S100, if, and
when he, Bartlett, should use the wall.
Bartlett did not use the wall. He has
conveyed his lot to Kingdon and K-ingdon
has used the wall. Must Kingdon pay
for it? And must he pay Densmore?
The Act of April 10, 1849, Ph. 600, applies by its terms to party walls in all portions of the state. By this Act, the right
to compensation for the party wall would

have passed to Gray, but for the covenant
of Bartlett to pay it to Densmore. Voight
v. Wallace, 179 Pa. 520. The express covenant of Bartlett, whatever its effect on
Gray's right, has imposed a duty towards
Densmore, despite his preceding conveyance.
Has this right passed to his
alienee?
The answer to this question presupposes the answer to the question whether
the obligation of the covenant of Gray ran
with the land. Densmore, as we have
said, was not the owner of the lot
on which the building had been erected
at the time of taking the covenant
from Bartlett. He may have had a contract with Gray, that he should receive
the compensation for a future use of the
wall. He had, if this was so, a mere right
to a sum of money. Although the covenant, on Bartlett's part, is for himself, heirs
and assigns, this covenant does not. we
think, carry over to Bartlett's grantee,
Kingdon, any liability. Cf. 8 Am. &
Eng. Encyc. 1:35, 18 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
15. Although for different reasons, we
reach the conclusion of the learned court
beloW.
Judgment affirmed.

